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1Framework Paper
A remarkable expansion of the field of studies can currently be witnessed in economics
as many areas previously considered to belong to sociology, psychology, and other
sciences are drawing the attention of economists. One area that has been assimilated
in the course of this expansion is the economic analysis of sports. Originally, the
motivating idea behind this approach was to apply a “...dose of economic thinking to
the business of sports” (Fort, 2003). Indeed, research has shown that economics can
greatly help the sports industry by providing insights into the sports labor market,
the demand for sports, the institutional design of sporting contests, and many other
related topics.
However, in recent years it has been realized that the economic analysis of specta-
tor sports can also be viewed from the opposite perspective, and be used to illustrate
universal economic principles (Rosen & Sanderson, 2001). The logic of this new ap-
proach is that spectator sports provides in many ways a perfect laboratory for studying
economic questions: an abundance of data is readily available, the goals of the actors
are often straightforward, the stakes are typically high, the subjects are experienced
professionals, and the outcomes are extremely clear (Palacios-Huerta, 2014).
Following this idea, game theory has been tested using soccer players’ penalty
kicks and tennis players’ serves (Chiappori, Levitt, & Groseclose, 2002; Walker &
Wooders, 2001). Prospect theory has been tested using golfers’ decision-making on
the green (Pope & Schweitzer, 2011), and important insights on the resource-based
view of the firm have been gained from studies of professional team sports (Berman,
Down, & Hill, 2002; Holcomb, Holmes Jr, & Connelly, 2009). The common thread of
2all these highly-recognized studies is that they draw conclusions on economic theories
based on human behavior observed in professional sports.
This dissertation takes first one vantage point, then the other in employing the
economic analysis of sports to ask both what sports can learn from economics and what
economics can learn from sports. Since the economic literature devoted to the study of
sports is still in its infancy, there are countless interesting and unanswered questions
that can be asked from each of the two perspectives: new questions on the labor
market for professional athletes and the governance and regulatory actions of sports
governing bodies have arisen as sports clubs and competitions have globalized in their
search for greater performance and exposure. The rise of sports-related industries
such as broadcasting or betting also demand to be studied more closely. And the
only limit to what economics can learn from sports seems to be its own ability to find
questions to which the plethora of data from sports can give an answer.
The greater objective of this dissertation is to address a few carefully selected
questions having a dual perspective on the economics of sports in mind: illuminating
the world of sports through economics and making progress in the world of economics
through sports. The selected questions are individually addressed in three empirical
papers.1
The first paper, Managers’ external social ties at work: Blessing or curse for
the firm? (see Appendix A.1), investigates how managers’ history of social relations
influences firm-level decision-making and overall firm performance. While previous
research has shown that newly formed social ties to internal coworkers can lead to
favoritism and reduced firm performance (Bandiera, Barankay, & Rasul, 2009), we
examine the question of whether social ties to others outside the firm can interfere
1The introductory words of this dissertation were inspired by Beautiful Game Theory: How Soccer Can Help Eco-
nomics, a recently published and excellent book by Ignacio Palacios-Huerta (2014).
3with employees’ optimal selection of transaction partners and thereby harm firm per-
formance
To address this research question, we use the sports industry as a laboratory
because professional sport offers an ideal setting to study the effect of managers’
external, social ties: “There is no research setting other than sports where we know
the name, face, and life history of every production worker and supervisor in the
industry ... and [where] we have a complete data set of worker-employer matches over
the career of each production worker and supervisor in the industry” (Kahn, 2000,
p. 75). In line with this idea, we use 34 years of data from the National Basketball
Association (NBA) and combine each team’s record of player acquisitions and sporting
performance with data on the working history of its key decision maker: the general
manager.
In our empirical analysis, we study the relationship between a team’s winning
percentage and its use of players acquired by the general manager from his former
employers in the NBA. We find that teams with such tie-hired players underperform
teams without tie-hired players by a substantial 11 percent. Subsequent regression
analyses reveal that this difference in winning percentages cannot be explained by
adverse selection of general managers and teams into the use of tie-hiring procedures.
Rather, we show that agency theory and private, tie-related benefits for the general
managers best explain the negative effect because tie-hired players reduce team per-
formance only if they have been acquired in the presence of low monitoring incentives
for team owners. In contrast, if properly monitored by the owner, general managers
are found to be less likely to engage in such moral hazard behavior.
Overall, the paper demonstrates that – in the absence of appropriate performance
incentives – social ties to others outside the firm can undermine employees’ decision-
4making on behalf of the firm. This finding has important implications for the man-
agement and economics literature. Previous studies have found employees to make
tie-influenced decisions for the firm in connection with hiring (Fernandez & Wein-
berg, 1997; Williamson & Cable, 2003) financing (Shane & Cable, 2002), or investing
(Cohen, Frazzini, & Malloy, 2008). Anecdotal evidence also seems to suggest that
firms often seek well-connected employees. Our results show the hidden costs of such
hiring practices, and reveal the novel finding that managers’ tie-influenced decisions-
making can lead to a discriminating assessment of external transaction partners and
can sometimes become a curse for the firm.
The second paper, Tie-transfers and player performance in professional soccer (see
Appendix A.2), examines the effect of tie-influenced transfer decisions in professional
soccer. Conventional wisdom suggests that interpersonal networks have always played
an important role in clubs’ decision-making in the transfer market. However, little is
known about what is really going on in the transfer market. As noted by soccer writer
A. Thomas (2014): “It’s too big, and too disparate, and has far too many people and
far too much money moving around to be truly comprehensible”. Nevertheless, as the
global transfer market in professional soccer has become big business in the last few
decades, it is important for all actors in the game to better understand the influence
of interpersonal networks on transfer decision outcomes.
Drawing on economic literature on the referral-hiring phenomenon and the effects
of social ties, this paper provides insights on one prominent form of interpersonal net-
work that plays an important role in clubs’ decision-making in the transfer market:
ties between coaches and players created by a past working relationship. Such coach–
player ties are supposed to mitigate search frictions in the recruitment of players
because coaches have first-hand information about the players they have previously
5worked with. But the possibility to improve transfer decisions through this channel
strongly depends on the coach’s ability to screen its player network effectively. Exist-
ing economic evidence on job referrals indicates that this ability cannot be taken for
granted because employees often lack a good understanding of which network mem-
bers will perform better and are unable to make good referrals for their employers
even when properly incentivized (Beaman & Magruder, 2012).
Using employment records to identify past working ties between coaches and play-
ers, we analyse over 2,300 transfer decisions from clubs in the German Bundesliga
in the period from 1995/96 until 2013/14. We find that players acquired through
transfers where coach and player have previously worked together outperform play-
ers acquired through other transfers by 3 percent. Hence, previous coach–player ties
can be a valuable resource for clubs’ transfer market activities. However, extended
analyses show that not all transfers involving a coach–player tie are equally desirable.
Transfers where a new coach brings a player straight from his previous club result in
an underperformance of the newly acquired players of almost 8 percent. Given the
strong disciplinary power of the labor market for professional soccer coaches (see e.g.,
Barros, Frick, & Passos, 2009) and the resulting strong incentives for coaches to make
“good” referrals, it seems that coaches mistakenly make “bad” referrals on players
with which they have worked together just recently at their prior clubs.
Taken together, the results from our study reveal that it is highly important to
know the contextual factors for an effective use of referral-hiring practices in profes-
sional soccer. While coach referrals can represent an attractive way of finding out
the club-specific value of players in many contexts, clubs have to be cautious when
a newly hired coach wants to bring players straight from his previous club because
such referrals result (on average) in poorer transfer decisions. Hence, coaches (and
6clubs) tend to underestimate certain contextual factors when hiring players straight
from their prior club.
The third paper, Does sports activity improve health? Representative evidence us-
ing proximity to sports facilities as an instrument (see Appendix A.3), investigates
the effect of leisure-time sports activity on health and health care utilization. Most
previous research on leisure-time sports activity in social sciences has come from so-
ciology, policy studies or management and has been qualitative and descriptive in
nature (Rodríguez, Késenne, & Humphreys, 2011).2 Meanwhile, economic research
on participation in sport and its relationship to health is not well developed. Our
paper contributes to this relatively unexplored field in economics and uses quantita-
tive, econometric methods (i.e., instrumental variable regression) to draw causal con-
clusions on the relationships between leisure-time sports activity and health-related
outcomes.
The main challenge in disentangling the relationship between sports activity and
health-related outcomes is that individuals endogenously decide whether to participate
in sports activities or not. Therefore, sports activity is likely correlated with many
(unobserved) confounders that can conceal true causalities. For example, health-
conscious people with a high level of body awareness may be more active but also
tend to get more health screenings and tend to visit the doctor more often. Another
confounder is a person’s (healthy or unhealthy) lifestyle, for example her nutrition or
sleeping behaviour. A healthy lifestyle is likely to be positively correlated with sports
activity and negatively correlated with health issues and health care utilization.
To address this self-selection problem, we employ an instrumental variables (IV)
strategy and use the geographic availability of sports facilities to predict individuals’
2Of course, participation in sport has also been widely examined from a clinical perspective in disciplines like sports
medicine, sports psychology or sports training.
7level of sports activity. The reasoning behind this strategy is that living close to
sports facilities implies easier access to sports infrastructure and reduces the “costs”
of doing sports. Therefore, geographic proximity to sports facilities is an ideal instru-
ment because it increases sports activity, and the supply of sports facilities is (at the
individual level) exogenous to unobservable factors affecting health and health care
utilization.3 We realize this strategy using representative and geocoded data from the
Swiss Household Panel (SHP) and the Swiss Business Census for the year 2008. The
geocoding of the data allows us to pinpoint linear distances between the residence of
SHP respondents and all sports facilities obtained from the Swiss Business Census
with a precision of a few meters and shows that proximity to a large number of sports
facilities significantly increases individual sports participation.
Based on this data, we find that doing sports at least once a week significantly
reduces the number of doctor visits, overweight and sleeping problems. The mag-
nitudes of these effects are larger in the IV estimations than in non-IV estimations,
which seem to be biased toward zero due to reporting errors in sports activity and an
omitted variable bias. Furthermore, our IV estimations show that sports activity has
no causal effect on the frequency of back problems and headaches, whereas non-IV
estimations find sports activity also to reduce these health issues. The non-IV results
seem to be negatively biased and to suffer from a reverse causation issue insofar as
individuals with back problems and headaches tend to reduce sports activity.
Taken together, the results of the study affirm that leisure-time sport is an im-
portant determinant of a healthy community and society and that the availability
of sports facilities plays an important role in individuals’ decisions to participate in
3As residential neighborhoods are not randomly assigned, we cannot completely rule out that unobserved health
determinants could influence residential sorting into neighborhoods with few or many sports facilities. Therefore, the
validity of the exogeneity condition of our IV models is carefully discussed in the paper.
8such activities. Our results are useful for estimating the cost-effectiveness of providing
sports facilities to encourage individual participation in sports activities as a way of
reducing health problems and health care utilization and also support the view that
governments should continue subsidizing sports activity in an environment of reduced
public resources (Rodríguez et al., 2011, p. 2).
In conclusion, this dissertation illuminates – in addition to the individual contribu-
tions of the three papers – the many exciting possibilities which arise from economic
analysis of the sports industry and sports data. While this research field has long been
regarded as an enjoyable pastime for traditional economists who like sports, the sig-
nificance of sports in the economy and in society has expanded dramatically in recent
years and so has the importance of literature on the economics of sports. With the
global sports market now being estimated to achieve revenues of more than US$100
billion each year (PwC, 2011), the analysis of sports has occupied a permanent and
established position in economic research. The following three papers contribute to
this emerging strand of literature and lay the ground for future research either to ben-
efit the sports industry through economic thinking, theory and methods or to benefit
economics through the analysis of human behavior observed in professional sports.
9References
Bandiera, O., Barankay, I., & Rasul, I. (2009). Social connections and incentives in
the workplace: Evidence from personnel data. Econometrica, 77 (4), 1047–1094.
Barros, C. P., Frick, B., & Passos, J. (2009). Coaching for survival: The hazards
of head coach careers in the German Bundesliga. Applied Economics, 41 (25),
3303–3311.
Beaman, L., & Magruder, J. (2012). Who gets the job referral? Evidence from a
social networks experiment. American Economic Review, 102 (7), 3574–3593.
Berman, S., Down, J., & Hill, C. (2002). Tacit knowledge as a source of competitive
advantage in the National Basketball Association. Academy of Management
Journal, 45 (1), 13–31.
Chiappori, P.-A., Levitt, S., & Groseclose, T. (2002). Testing mixed-strategy equi-
libria when players are heterogeneous: The case of penalty kicks in soccer.
American Economic Review, 92 (4), 1138–1151.
Cohen, L., Frazzini, A., & Malloy, C. (2008). The small world of investing: Board
connections and mutual fund returns. Journal of Political Economy, 116 (5),
951–979.
Fernandez, R., & Weinberg, N. (1997). Sifting and sorting: Personal contacts and
hiring in a retail bank. American Sociological Review, 62 (6), 883–902.
Fort, R. (2003). Sports economics. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall.
Holcomb, T. R., Holmes Jr, R. M., & Connelly, B. L. (2009). Making the most of what
you have: Managerial ability as a source of resource value creation. Strategic
Management Journal, 30 (5), 457–485.
Kahn, L. M. (2000). The sports business as a labor market laboratory. Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 14 (3), 75–94.
Palacios-Huerta, I. (2014). Beautiful game theory: How soccer can help economics.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Pope, D. G., & Schweitzer, M. E. (2011). Is Tiger Woods loss averse? Persistant bias
in the face of experience, competition, and high stakes. American Economic
Review, 101 (1), 129–157.
PwC. (2011, December). Changing the game: Outlook for the global sports market
to 2015. Retrieved December 31, 2014, from http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/
10
hospitality-leisure/pdf/changing-the-game-outlook-for-the-global
-sports-market-to-2015.pdf.
Rodríguez, P., Késenne, S., & Humphreys, B. R. (2011). The economics of sport,
health and happiness: The promotion of well-being through sporting activities.
Glos: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Rosen, S., & Sanderson, A. (2001). Labour markets in professional sports. The
Economic Journal, 111 (469), 47–68.
Shane, S., & Cable, D. (2002). Network ties, reputation, and the financing of new
ventures. Management Science, 48 (3), 364–381.
Thomas, A. (2014, July). The european soccer transfer market, explained. Re-
trieved December 31, 2014, from http://www.sbnation.com/soccer/2014/7/
28/5923187/transfer-window-soccer-europe-explained.
Walker, M., & Wooders, J. (2001). Minimax play at Wimbledon. American Economic
Review, 91 (5), 1521–1538.
Williamson, I., & Cable, D. (2003). Organizational hiring patterns, interfirm network
ties, and interorganizational imitation. Academy of Management Journal, 46 (3),
349–358.
11
A Appendix: Papers included in this dissertation

A.1
Managers’ external social ties at work:
Blessing or curse for the firm?∗†
Abstract
Existing evidence shows that decision makers’ social ties to internal co-
workers can lead to reduced firm performance. In this article, we show that
decision makers’ social ties to external transaction partners can also hurt firm
performance. Specifically, we use 34 years of data from the National Basketball
Association and study the relationship between a team’s winning percentage
and its use of players that the manager acquired through social ties to former
employers in the industry. We find that teams with “tie-hired-players” under-
perform teams without tie-hired-players by 5 percent. This effect is large enough
to change the composition of teams that qualify for the playoffs. Importantly,
we show that adverse selection of managers and teams into the use of tie-hiring
procedures cannot fully explain this finding. Additional evidence suggests in-
stead that managers deliberately trade-off private, tie-related benefits against
team performance.
JEL Classification: D82; M51; Z13
Keywords: social relationships; social capital; principal–agent relationship; worker
allocation; basketball
∗This paper has been written jointly with Leif Brandes and Egon Franck.
†Reprinted from Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 109, Brandes, L., Brechot, M., & Franck, E., Man-
agers’ external social ties at work: Blessing or curse for the firm?, 203–216, Copyright (2015), with permission from
Elsevier.
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1 Introduction
A person’s social relations are a key influence factor for her attitudes, preferences, and
(economic) decision-making. When searching for a job, for example, individuals have
been found to frequently rely on information and resources from their social contacts
(Montgomery, 1991; Bewley, 1999; Ioannides & Loury, 2004; Jackson, 2006). In the
workplace, newly formed social ties to others within the firm have been found to affect
employee productivity and overall firm performance (Bandiera, Barankay, & Rasul,
2005, 2008, 2009, 2010).
This paper documents field evidence on whether and how employees’ history of
social relations and experiences outside the firm influences firm-level decision-making
and overall firm performance. We focus on a prominent form of historical, external
social relationships: pre-existing, strong social ties to colleagues at a former employer
in the same industry. Such ties are potentially very influential for firm-level decisions,
as they create opportunities for on-going business transactions (e.g., resource acqui-
sitions). However, the question whether tie-influenced transactions pose a blessing or
a curse for the firm remains unresolved. On the one hand, external ties to others in
the industry may help firm performance, as they provide superior access to relevant
market information. On the other hand, it is reasonable to expect that external social
ties can harm firm performance if they interfere with employees’ optimal selection of
transaction partners.1
1Bandiera et al. (2009) and Beaman and Magruder (2012) argue that social networks create network-based incentives,
which lead to a form of social transfer between network contacts. This explains why individuals prefer to recommend
their less able family members (instead of more able weak ties) as workers to firms. Similarly, Lawler and Yoon
(1998) argue that interactions through social ties lead to greater positive emotions than interactions with strangers.
Such private benefits for decision makers may distort their decision-making on behalf of the firm, and may lead to an
excessive reduction in the universe of potential transaction partners, which causes a suboptimal match of resources
and firms. Note that this idea is essentially an agency argument.
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To determine the overall performance effect of tie-influenced transactions we con-
struct a novel data set from an unusual but interesting industry: the National Bas-
ketball Association (NBA).2 Specifically, we use the complete event history of the
NBA in its current form (since 1977) and combine a team’s record of player acquisi-
tions and sporting performance with data on the working history of its key decision
maker: the general manager. Our empirical focus lies on the performance effect of
player acquisitions that the general manager3 makes from his former employers in the
NBA. Therefore, we test the null hypothesis that teams with “tie-hired-players” show
identical sporting performances as teams without tie-hired-players.
Four characteristics make our unusual setting ideal to study the overall perfor-
mance effect of managers’ external, social ties. First, each team employs only one
manager at a time who is ultimately responsible for the team’s most important trans-
actions: player acquisitions. Second, we have industry-wide information on each
manager’s complete working history, and the identity of his former colleagues (i.e.,
team owners and head coaches). In each season, this allows us to identify each man-
ager’s set of active, strong social ties to other teams in the NBA. Third, we observe
the number of game appearances for each player in the industry, which allows us to
measure the relative importance of tie-hired-players in team production. Finally, we
2There exists a growing literature that uses sports data sets to study general economic and organizational phenomena,
because they provide statistics that “are much more detailed and accurate than typical microdata samples” (Kahn,
2000, p. 75). Examples include Pfeffer and Davis-Blake (1986), Walker and Wooders (2001), Berman, Down, and
Hill (2002), Chiappori, Levitt, and Groseclose (2002), Barden and Mitchell (2007), Moliterno and Wiersema (2007),
Holcomb, Holmes Jr, and Connelly (2009), Aime, Johnson, Ridge, and Hill (2010), Price and Wolfers (2010), Pope
and Schweitzer (2011), Berger and Pope (2011), Kocher, Lenz, and Sutter (2012), Massey and Thaler (2013), and
Bartling, Brandes, and Schunk (2014).
3In the remainder of this paper, we use the simple term “manager” to refer to a team’s general manager.
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observe an objective measure of team performance: the team’s sporting success in the
regular season.4
Our empirical analysis shows that the effect of tie-hired-players on team perfor-
mance is negative. Based on a simple mean comparison, we find that teams with
tie-hired-players underperform teams without tie-hired-players by a substantial 11
percent. Subsequent regression analyses reveal that this difference in winning per-
centages stems from teams’ use of tie-hired-players on the court and not from (un-
observed) quality differences of teams and managers: controlling for manager and
team fixed-effects, a team’s budget, and other observable characteristics, the average
tie-hired-player reduces team performance by about 5 percent. Importantly, we show
that the negative performance effect of tie-hired-players is robust across two additional
social tie definitions that include up to 190 tie-hired-players.
In an extended analysis, we address the underlying mechanism for this finding and
show that tie-hired-players reduce team performance only if they have been acquired
in the presence of low monitoring incentives for team owners. Our estimation approach
builds on different streams of psychological research (e.g., Schoorman, 1988; Shepherd,
Wiklund, & Haynie, 2009) suggesting that monitoring incentives should be lower for an
owner who personally hired a manager than for an owner who “inherited” a manager
from the previous owner. Information on manager turnover in the NBA supports the
idea that new owners engage in stronger monitoring: within one year of an ownership
change, 48 percent of pre-existing managers are replaced. Overall, the results of our
4A small existing literature in finance and strategic management relies on investor reactions to decision announcements
as a“jury verdict” to measure the performance effect of tie-influenced decisions (e.g., Fracassi & Tate, 2012; Tian,
Haleblian, & Rajagopalan, 2011; Ishii & Xuan, 2014). However, the announcement of, e.g., merger decisions may
cause substantial disagreement regarding the performance effect among investors (which are also known to exhibit a
number of systematic valuation biases). This evaluation problem disappears in our research setting: at the end of a
game, there can be no doubt which team won.
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study suggest that managers deliberately use their external social ties to pursue goals
other than team performance maximization.5
A unique feature of the institutional environment of our data allows us to address
potential concerns about endogeneity bias as a source for our finding. That is, players
may either be hired in the off-season period between two seasons, or after the beginning
of a new season. To avoid any feedback from team performance at the beginning of
the season on subsequent hiring decisions, we conduct another analysis, in which we
focus only on a team’s use of off-season tie-hired-players. Based on this approach,
we still find a negative performance effect of tie-hired-players, and that this effect
stems from tie-hired-players that the manager acquired under weak monitoring. Even
when we acknowledge that off-season tie-hired-players may be influenced by a team’s
performance in the previous season, we find that the performance effect of tie-hired-
players is negative and depends on whether they have been acquired under weak or
strong monitoring by the owner. Overall, we show that adverse selection of teams and
managers into the use of tie-hiring procedures cannot fully explain our findings.
While the setting of this analysis is unusual, the results of our study have fairly
broad implications. Several studies in the management and economics literature reveal
that employees’ external social ties influence their decision-making on behalf of the
firm, for example, in connection with hiring (Fernandez &Weinberg, 1997; Williamson
& Cable, 2003) financing (Shane & Cable, 2002), or investing (Cohen, Frazzini, &
Malloy, 2008).6 Anecdotal evidence also seems to suggest that firms often seek well-
connected employees. Our industry-wide analysis shows the hidden costs of such
hiring practices, and reveals the novel finding that network-based incentives can lead
5Importantly, we do not find evidence in our data that ownership changes reflect a previous reduction in team
performance: team winning percentage in the year before the arrival of a new owner (46.3%) is virtually identical to
the team’s average winning percentage in all previous years under the original owner (46.8%).
6However, these studies do not address the performance effect of tie-influenced decisions for the firm.
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to discrimination of external transaction partners.7 We also show that firms can
counterbalance this form of discrimination, if they are willing to incur additional
costs (e.g., in the form of extended monitoring). This second finding extends, and
confirms the insights of a recent, small economic literature that shows how incentive
contracts reduce workers’ favoritism toward socially connected others (Bandiera et
al., 2009; Beaman & Magruder, 2012; Beaman et al., 2013).
We structure this paper as follows. In the next Section, we provide a brief back-
ground on player acquisitions and managers in the NBA. In Section 3, we present our
research hypothesis, and theoretical framework. In Section 4, we present our estima-
tion approach to determine the effect of tie-hired-players on team performance. In
Section 5, we present our empirical results. In Section 6, we conclude.
2 Background information
To follow the analysis in this paper, it is important to have some background regarding
the NBA, its labor market and the role of NBA managers. In this section, we therefore
briefly discuss the nature of player acquisitions in the NBA and two key aspects of
managers in the NBA: their stereotypical profile and their outside options on the labor
market.
Since its merger with the American Basketball Association (ABA) in 1976, the
NBA has been the only major professional basketball league in Northern America.
The (combined) league initially had 22 teams in 1976/77 and has expanded since, and
7Few empirical studies address the negative performance effects of external social ties. However, the findings of
these studies differ from ours, as they only show negative performance effects when decision makers bring their
social contacts inside the firm (e.g., through job recommendations (Beaman & Magruder, 2012; Beaman, Keleher,
& Magruder, 2013), through mergers (Ishii & Xuan, 2014) or as supervisors to reduce monitoring (Fracassi & Tate,
2012)). As we discuss further in Section 4.2, a manager’s social ties in our study do not relate to the hired player,
but to the coach or owner (or both) of the player’s current team. Accordingly, the manager’s social ties still remain
outside the boundaries of his team after a player transaction.
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as of 2011, the NBA consists of 30 teams in two conferences. Each team plays 82 games
over the course of a season, before the eight best teams in each conference proceed
into the playoffs to determine the league champion. To increase their performance,
teams compete for the most talented players on a restricted labor market.
There are two important features of player acquisitions in the NBA that distinguish
them from the hiring decisions of firms in other industries. First, a team can only
acquire new players from three different types of sources. These are: other teams
inside the NBA, other teams outside the NBA, and the annual player draft. In the
annual draft, teams are allowed to select upcoming college, high school or international
players from a pool of new, young players (so-called rookies). Acquisitions from other
NBA teams are by far the most popular choice of managers and account for 67 percent
of all player-hiring decisions followed by the draft (21%) and transactions with other
teams outside the NBA (12%). Thus, we can treat the NBA as a nearly closed system
of extraordinarily talented workers (who generally spend their entire careers within
this industry).
Second, there are two specific ways for a team to acquire players from other teams
inside the NBA. First, a manager can sign a player whose contract with another
team has expired as a “free-agent” by outbidding all other interested parties. This
transaction type accounts for 52.1 percent of all between-team transactions.8 Second,
managers can trade their players with on-going contracts for players with on-going
contracts from other teams. In this case, a single trade may involve multiple (>2)
transaction partners, each potentially trading more than one player. This transaction
8The exact procedure behind such free-agent signings differs slightly: in 74 percent of such signings, the player received
a long-term contract, in 22 percent, the player received a short-term contract (a so-called 10-day-contract), and in 4
percent the player was acquired by means of the expansion draft (which provides newly created teams the opportunity
to recruit players from a specific set of “unprotected” players from existing teams).
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type accounts for the other half (47.9%) of all player transactions between NBA teams.
Note that this transaction type does not require the consent of the players involved.
In each team, the responsibility for player acquisitions rests exclusively with the
team’s (general) manager who has been hired by the team owner to act on his behalf.
As we are ultimately interested in the consequences of the managers’ decision-making,
it is illuminating to look at these individuals more closely. We construct the stereotypi-
cal manager profile9 by looking at a manager’s average characteristics at the beginning
of a new contract spell throughout our sample period (1977/78 until 2010/11). Based
on this approach and the 146 active managers in this period, we can characterize the
stereotypical (newly hired) manager to be 46 years old, with slightly more than two
years of previous experience as a manager (where he generated an average winning
percentage of 0.488), and holding up to three previous positions as manager in the
NBA. 30.1 percent of the managers had a previous history as coach and 40.5 percent
of the managers had a previous history as player at the beginning of a new spell (re-
sulting in a combined average of 50.3 percent of managers with a previous history as
a player or coach (or both) in the NBA).
Regarding managers’ possibilities of getting re-hired at another NBA team after
the end of a work spell, we observe that around 31 percent take up another job as
a manager in the NBA. However, as far as managers’ outside options on the labor
market are concerned, many managers also re-appear in the NBA in other jobs after
the end of their manager career. While the exact job positions can be manifold, a
considerable 41 percent of these former managers take up one of the following four
9We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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positions with an NBA team: (assistant) coaches (14%), (vice) presidents (10%),
advisor (9%) or scouts (8%).10
3 Research hypothesis
We assume that a team owner hires a manager to maximize team performance by
acquiring the best available basketball players (subject to budget constraints). The
players that the manager acquires from other NBA teams come either from former
employers (we refer to such players as tie-hired-players), or from other teams (non-
tie-hired-players). We test the null hypothesis that teams with tie-hired-players show
identical sporting performances as teams without tie-hired-players.
Hypothesis 1: The sporting success of a team does not depend on its use of
tie-hired-players instead of non-tie-hired-players.
In contrast to this null hypothesis, social capital (e.g., Adler & Kwon, 2002) and
agency theory (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989) predict that tie-hired-players can affect team
performance. Although both theories suggest that managers use their social ties
deliberately to economize on search costs, they disagree on the associated performance
effect: social capital theory predicts a positive performance effect of tie-hired-players,
whereas agency theory predicts a negative performance effect. In the following, we
discuss each of these theories.
10These numbers are based on an analysis for 109 inactive managers with website entries on Wikipedia.com. Note
that the first two of these four positions are frequently rumored to be even better paid than manager positions: some
websites claim that the average manager salary was USD 1.5 million in 2009, and thus somewhat lower than the
USD 2.0 million for coaches. Similarly for team presidents, there is word that the average salary is comparable to
that of Fortune 500 CEOs and thus even higher (around USD 10 million in 2012). While these numbers partly lack
official confirmation, they suggest that the disciplinary power of the labor market for managerial decision-making
may be quite limited.
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In the NBA, information is an important element in properly matching players to
teams and positions. However, the search for better players and information comes at
substantial costs for teams, which calls for mechanisms to reduce such costs. In this
regard, a manager’s social ties may prove valuable to his team for several reasons.
Uzzi (1996), for example, notes that decision makers can reduce the high level of
uncertainty in hiring decisions through fine-grained information transfer in social tie
relationships. Similarly, Jackson (2010) argues that social networks allow for the
mitigation of substantial search frictions, as they enable the communication of critical
information to firms regarding the potential fit of workers. The use of social ties
further reduces search costs, as decision makers are able to use trusted social contacts
that are already in place and need not invest in constructing new ones (Granovetter,
2005). A manager who wishes to acquire the best available players in the market can
thus use his strong social ties to former employers as an instrument to achieve this
goal with substantially lower search costs for his team. Specifically, he can select an
acquisition source through his social ties, as the relational characteristics of social ties
allow for a more reliable information exchange based on trust and closeness (Moran,
2005).11
It is important to see that this reasoning can make the use of social ties bene-
ficial during conceptually different acquisition procedures such as player trades and
free-agent signings. That is, both acquisition procedures provide opportunities for
interactions and information exchange through social ties. In trades, the direct trans-
action partner is the player’s current team. In free-agent signings, the player’s current
11A manager’s external ties to other teams constitute “bridging ties” (in the sense of McEvily & Zaheer, 1999),
because they connect his team “to sources of information and opportunities that are not available from other
network contacts” (p. 1136). Intuitively, this view implies that social ties to players’ current employers provide
more precise information about their playing quality, than any other form of intra-industry social ties. In contrast
to Granovetter (1973), McEvily and Zaheer (1999) argue that such bridging ties are not always weak ties. Indeed, the
degree of knowledge sharing between organizational units has been shown to increase with tie-strength (Tortoriello,
Reagans, & McEvily, 2012).
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team does not form the direct transaction partner (because the team no longer holds
property rights over him) but can be contacted for up-to-date information about the
free-agent, and his availability.
However, agency theory may also have some explanatory power in the context of
tie-influenced player acquisitions in the NBA. That is, the owner-manager relationship
exhibits all of the factors necessary to cause substantial agency costs. First, the owner
and manager are linked by a principal–agent relationship in which the manager has
been hired to act on the behalf of the owner. Second, the manager has substantially
greater expert knowledge in professional basketball than the owner, which gives the
manager an informational advantage: between 1977/78 and 2010/11, only 3 percent
of team owners could build on a career history as player or coach in professional bas-
ketball, while a (slight) majority of 53 percent of managers could do so. Accordingly,
managers can be assumed to have a substantially higher specific knowledge (most
of which can be assumed to be tacit knowledge from their game experiences) about
“what it takes” for a team to succeed in the NBA. Third, the owner is unable to
judge the quality of a manager’s search effort, as a player’s fit into a team cannot
be directly inferred from his performance statistics with other teams. Instead, the
manager must expend substantial search effort to improve the fit. As the marginal
benefit of this search effort is unobservable, the manager has the opportunity to use
social ties to pursue his self-interest instead of the team owner’s interest. We now
provide a theoretical justification for why managers’ and team owners’ self-interests
may not be perfectly aligned.
Researchers in the corporate governance literature have long acknowledged that
the residual claims of owners are unlimited in time whereas the employment contracts
of managers have limited durations by definition. As a consequence, owners have
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incentives to pay attention to the entire future stream of payoffs (cash, utility, prestige
etc.) generated by their firm, while managers will only value payoffs yielded during
their limited tenure with the firm (see Jensen & Smith, 1985, p. 11). As a consequence,
managers systematically place lower value on payoffs that occur beyond their limited
time horizon (see also Jensen & Meckling, 1979; Furubotn & Pejovich, 1973), which
can distort their decision-making to the disadvantage of the owner.
In the context of the NBA, we find that this line of reasoning might indeed have
some explanatory bite for the decision-making of managers: while managers stay, on
average, for five years with a team, the corresponding tenure for owners is almost
twelve years, and thus significantly larger (t = 7.18, p < 0.001). Moreover, owners
have tradable residual claims, which allow them to capitalize on future payoffs. Ac-
cordingly, a manager will base his behavior much more on the involved search costs
(which he incurs today) than on the decisions’ long-term implications (which he bears
only for a limited time). This reasoning stands in sharp contrast to the owner who
bears the complete long-term implications (e.g., in terms of reduced future team value)
of the manager’s decisions. In connection with the labor market’s limited disciplinary
power for managers (see Section 2), suboptimal hiring decisions (from the owner’s
perspective) by the manager become a real possibility.12
Two examples for managers’ self-interest maximization to the disadvantage of team
owners are choices characterized by inefficiently low effort levels and the selection of
inefficient transaction partners that create private benefits for the manager. In the
first case, the use of social ties helps to reduce disutility from search efforts, as social
relations form a salient selection criterion for prechoice activities. Such activities re-
12In spite of the idea that managers pursue self-interests that differ from those of owners, team owners might prefer
some managers to others. That is, the owner perceives manager A to be better than manager B if A’s decisions lead
to smaller agency costs for the owner than B’s decisions.
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duce personal workload, as they reduce the number of choice alternatives that need to
be evaluated in the decision process.13 Similarly, Levin and Cross (2004) acknowledge
that managers may simply approach socially tied others for convenience. This can
cause better-suited players in the market to be neglected, as they are currently under
contract with unrelated teams. In the second case, managers often derive additional,
private utility from interactions with socially connected others. Specifically, such in-
teractions can produce positive emotions such as feelings of pleasure and enjoyment
(Lawler & Yoon, 1998; Bandiera et al., 2010) and can lead to a form of “consump-
tion on the job” for managers. Therefore, such network-based incentives can distort
the manager’s cost-benefit evaluation of a transaction partner, leading again to an
inefficient focus on socially tied teams in player acquisitions.14 Again, this effect may
influence managers’ decision-making for player trades, and free-agent signings, alike.
We want to stress that both types of self-interest maximization can occur al-
though managers have strong incentives to do well with their teams. Specifically, we
acknowledge that a manager’s future career depends on how well he does with his cur-
rent team. However, this does not imply that the manager is never willing to engage
in suboptimal hiring decisions. Instead, it suggests that suboptimal hiring decisions
can occur whenever the increase in expected utility for the manager (as previously
described) outweighs his expected disutility from a (slight) reduction in team perfor-
mance. Importantly, our data suggest that managers can get away with reduced team
performance much more easily than coaches: while a coach’s appointment ends, on
13See the discussion in Beach (1993).
14See Bandiera et al. (2009) and Beaman and Magruder (2012) for analytical models that can be adopted to reflect the
decision problem for managers in the NBA. Intuitively speaking, the manager has two sources of utility: a (sporting-)
performance-dependent bonus if he hires a “good” player, and a social transfer (monetary or non-monetary) from
transactions with socially tied others. If, all else equal, the social transfer is sufficiently high, the manager may
be willing to forego the performance-based utility component, and hire a “mediocre” player (i.e., a player with
suboptimal match) through his social ties.
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average, after 2.79 years, managers remain with a team for about five years (t = 5.64,
p < 0.001).
4 Estimation approach
4.1 Data
We construct a new data set with all 908 team-year observations in the period from
1977/78 until 2010/11. For each season, our data set includes information on each
team’s regular-season winning percentage and roster characteristics (such as payroll,
total number of players on the roster, total game appearances of players, and new
players on the roster). We combine this data with the complete transaction history
between all teams. We obtained this information from Sports Reference LLC, a pro-
fessional company that specializes in the collection and publication of sports data.
4.2 Identification of manager social ties and tie-hired-players
We focus on a prominent type of managers’ social relationships to identify their set
of external social ties: the social ties to colleagues at a former employer (i.e., another
NBA team).15 Such ties are potentially very influential for managers’ decision-making,
as managers frequently acquire players from other teams inside the NBA. Therefore, it
is reasonable to expect that managers who have started a new employment relationship
continue to interact with their former employers on the market for player talent. Our
15Similarly, McEvily, Jaffee, and Tortoriello (2012) use co-working histories of lawyers to study the effect of employees’
external social ties on firm growth. However, our focus on personal ties to other teams implies that we only include
between-team player acquisitions in our analysis. While this procedure may seem restrictive at first glance, there
is good reason to exclude drafted players. Camerer and Weber (1999), for example, show that top drafted players
in the NBA play excessive minutes (relative to their performance). That is, teams often “overuse” their top draft
picks, which can lead to negative performance effects. Similarly, teams may expose substantial biases that lead to
financial overvaluation of top picks (see Massey and Thaler (2013) for evidence in the National Football League
(NFL)).
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data support this idea: managers are 32 percent more likely to acquire players from
socially tied teams than from unrelated teams.
We identify a manager’s active social tie to another team from two requirements.
First, he must previously have worked for that team (as a manager). Second, the cur-
rent owner or head coach (or both) of that team continue to be his former colleagues.
This second requirement stems from the observation that a manager’s working history
with another team may inappropriately reflect a social tie if none of his former col-
leagues continue to work for that team.16 To operationalize, on a seasonal level, the
set of active social ties to other teams for each of the 146 managers in our sample, we
collect his full employment history (including work spells before 1977) and combine it
with the full employment and ownership histories of head coaches and team owners,
respectively.
The following example helps to clarify our identification approach: In 2004, John
Nash was the manager of the Portland Trailblazers. At this point, Nash had an
employment history with the Philadelphia 76ers and the Washington Wizards, and
hence these were two potential candidates for his set of external, strong social ties.
During Nash’s time in Washington (1991–1996), Abe Pollin had been the owner of the
Wizards, and he remained the owner in 2004. Thus, Nash had an active social tie to
Washington in 2004.17 However, we do not observe an active social tie to Philadelphia,
as the coaches and owner he had worked with at Philadelphia during 1987–1990 had
16As we show in the Appendix, our results are robust to the use of two extended social tie measures. The first measure
also includes a manager’s history as a coach with former teams. The second measure allows for the possibility that
a manager maintains ties to all his previous employers, irrespective of whether his colleagues on the coach, manager
or owner level are still with those teams (meaning that we drop the second requirement of our original identification
approach).
17This is a very representative example for the origin of social ties in our sample leading to tie-influenced player
acquisitions. Specifically, 84.7 percent of all our tie-hired-players arrived through purely owner-related ties, while
another 13.9 percent of our tie-hired-players arrived through ties that include both, the owner and the coach. Only
a mere 1.4 percent (only one case) of our tie-hired-players arrived through purely coach-related ties. Therefore, we
are unable to model different effects for tie-hired-players that arrived through pure coach-ties and those that arrived
through pure owner-ties. We leave this important aspect for future research.
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already left before 2004. Note that our procedure gives rise to non-reciprocal social
ties between managers and teams: for example, the manager of Washington in 2004,
Wes Unseld, did not have a social tie to Portland, as he had never worked for that
team before.
To classify players into the groups of tie-hired-players and non-tie-hired-players,
we use the complete record of all player acquisition decisions in our sample period.
We identify a player as a tie-hired-player if a manager’s social tie was involved in
the player’s acquisition and if it is the player’s first season with the new team. We
focus on a player’s first year for two reasons. First, teams might drop players who
performed poorly in their first season, which is why using multiple years would create
a survivorship bias in our estimates. In fact, only 38 percent of all tie-hired-players
in our sample stay with their team for more than one season. Second, players acquire
tacit knowledge and assimilate over time. Thus, a player’s performance in his first
season with a team promises to be a better quality measure of the hiring decision than
his performance in subsequent seasons.18 Based on this approach, and depending on
the restrictiveness of the social tie definition (see Appendix), we classify between 72
and 190 players in our data set as tie-hired-players.
An example of a tie-hired-player is when the New Jersey Nets acquired Eduardo
Najera from the Denver Nuggets on July 16, 2008. Before that, New Jersey’s manager,
Kiki Vandeweghe, had worked with George Karl (the 2008 head coach of the Nuggets)
and Stan Kroenke (the 2008 owner of the Nuggets) at Denver. To re-emphasize an
important point: the decisive criterion for a player to be classified as a tie-hired-
player is not that the manager gained first-hand information about this player during
18As we show in Section 5.3, however, our results are robust to an alternative analysis in which a tie-hired-player
keeps his status as a tie-hired-player during all seasons of his initial contract with the new team.
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previous employment spells, but that the manager acquired the player from a team
to which he had an active social tie at the time of the acquisition.
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the most important variables in our data
set. In Panel A, we show statistics on the team level. While teams had tie-hired-
players in only 6 percent (N = 53) of our team-year observations, the use of tie-hired-
players (if present) is quite substantial: on average, all tie-hired-players on a team
appear in 50 games for their teams.19 Note from Table 1 that payroll information
is unavailable for nine seasons (1977/78–1984/85, and 1989/90) during our sample
period, which leads to a substantially lower number of observations (N = 700).
In Panel B, we show statistics on the individual manager level. Of particular
interest is a manager’s potential for tie-hiring decisions. We construct this number as
follows: in each season, a manager has as many opportunities for tie-hiring decisions,
as he has active ties to other teams. By summing up these seasonal opportunities over
his career years, we obtain his total potential for tie-hiring decisions. On average,
this potential is 1.39 leading to 0.50 tie-hiring decisions over the career. While these
numbers are quite low, they reflect on the small number of managers who ever worked
for more than one team. Therefore, Panel C provides the same statistics for the
subsample of managers who ever had any ties. For each of these managers, the
statistics reflect only years with active social ties. We can see that these managers
account for 22 percent of all managers in our sample, had a potential for tie-hiring
decisions of 6.36, and made on average two tie-hiring decisions throughout those years,
which amounts to 6.7 percent of all their hiring decisions. Note that there exists
substantial heterogeneity among managers, as this share is as high as 50 percent for
some of them.
19A closer examination of our data also shows that approximately 50 percent of all NBA teams used tie-hired-players
on the court in at least one season.
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Table 1
Summary statistics.
Variables Mean Std.dev. Min. Max. N
Panel A: team level
Team winning percentage 0.50 0.15 0.134 0.878 908
Team uses tie-hired-player (dummy) 0.06 0.23 0 1 908
Games played by tie-hired-players 49.53 43.28 0 194 53
Games played by all team players 819.58 64.69 471 944 908
Players used within season 16.19 2.44 11 27 908
Payroll (in mio $) 36.85 23.17 2.91 101.37 700
Panel B: manager level (all managers)
Potential for tie-hiring decisions (over career) 1.397 3.736 0 20 141
Number of tie-hiring decisions (over career) 0.511 1.329 0 8 141
Number of hiring decisions (over career) 40.830 35.298 3 186 141
Share of tie-hiring decisions 0.011 0.045 0 0.50 141
Career length (years) 6.440 5.626 1 25 141
Panel C: manager level (managers with social ties in years with social ties)
Potential for tie-hiring decisions 6.355 5.707 1 20 31
Number of tie-hiring decisions 2.065 2.097 0 8 31
Number of hiring decisions 38.839 29.243 4 124 31
Share of tie-hiring decisions 0.067 0.088 0 0.50 31
Career years with social ties 5.613 4.652 1 17 31
Notes: With the exception of payroll (unavailable for 1977/78–1984/85, and in 1989/90), displayed statistics are for
the 1977/78–2010/11 seasons.
4.3 Methodology
To analyze the effect of tie-hired-players on team performance, we regress a team’s
sporting performance on the number of game appearances by tie-hired-players, payroll,
number of players used (to account for bad injury luck), and a team’s number of
games played by all players. We always use the exact number of game appearances
such that, for example, the use of two tie-hired-players in one game leads to two
more game appearances by tie-hired-players. Importantly, we also include team and
manager fixed-effects to account for the performance effect of unobserved team and
manager quality, respectively.20 By controlling for a team’s payroll, the coefficient on
game appearances by tie-hired-players (THP-games) indicates whether a team with
tie-hired-players over- or underperforms relative to what could be expected from the
20From time to time, teams relocate and re-appear in the league under a new name. However, the league treats these
teams as a continuous legal entity, independent of the team name and host city. Similar to Barden and Mitchell
(2007) for Major League Baseball, we adopt the league’s perspective on the identification of team-units (e.g., the
Oklahoma City Thunder and the Seattle Supersonics are the same team in our data).
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market valuation of its player talent in a specific season. To make payrolls comparable
across seasons, we use inflation-adjusted payrolls (1986 = 100) in all our estimations.
Note, however, that the inclusion of the payroll variable comes at a cost, as this
information is not available for each season in our sample.
Our approach closely follows previous work by Szymanski (2000) and models a
team’s logarithmic winning percentage as a function of team-level variables (relative
to their league averages in a season):
log(win-pct)ts = β0 + β1 · THP-gamests + β2 · payrollts+
β3 · players-used ts + β4 · team-gamests + αt + αm + ts,
(1)
where the subscripts t, m and s denote teams, managers and seasons, and where
(·) denotes the difference between a variable and its league average in season s. The
dependent variable log(win-pct) is the (logarithmic) regular season winning percentage
of team t in season s.21
The coefficient of interest is β1 and measures the effect of tie-hired-players on team
performance. By our inclusion of a team’s players’ total number of games played in
Eq. (1), β1 answers the following question: what is the performance effect of using
a tie-hired-player in one more regular season game, holding the overall number of
player-game appearances for the team constant. That is, β1 measures the performance
effect of the substitution of a tie-hired-player for a non-tie-hired-player on the team, as
increasing the number of games played by tie-hired-players corresponds to a reduction
21An alternative empirical approach would have been to adopt an event study design, in which team performance
in matches before the hiring decision is compared to team performance in matches after the hiring decision. We
decided not to adopt such an empirical design, because many hirings occur in the “off-season” period. That is, in
many cases, there exists a substantial time gap between matches before and after the hiring decision, which makes
this identification approach less appealing to us.
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in the number of games played by non-tie-hired-players. While social capital theory
predicts that β1 will be positive, agency theory predicts it will be negative.
5 Empirical results
5.1 Model-free evidence
Before we turn to the estimation results of Eq. (1), we report the results of a model-free
analysis of our data. Specifically, we compare winning percentages across the groups
of teams that use tie-hired-players on the court and teams that do not.22 We find
that teams with tie-hired-players win 45.2 percent of their regular season games, while
teams in the other group win 50.2 percent of their games (t = 2.31, p < 0.05). This
implies that teams with tie-hired-players underperform their competitors without tie-
hired-players by 11 percent. This finding therefore provides initial, suggestive evidence
against the null hypothesis that a team’s use of tie-hired-players does not impact its
sporting success.
5.2 Regression analysis
Table 2 shows regression estimates for the performance effect of using tie-hired-players
on the team instead of other players. In Model (M1), we only introduce team fixed-
effects in the analysis, while Models (M2) and (M3) incorporate our other controls
and manager fixed-effects, respectively. In contrast to the null hypothesis, all models
reveal that tie-hired-players reduce team performance. We emphasize that the neg-
ative performance effect of tie-hired-players cannot simply reflect adverse selection
22To make teams more comparable, we exclude eleven team-year observations in which a team did not acquire any
new players from other teams inside the NBA. However, our results are robust to the inclusion of these observations.
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Table 2
The effect of the use of tie-hired-players (THP) on team performance.
Variables OLS OLS OLS
M1 M2 M3
(1978–2011) (1986–2011) (1986–2011)
Games played by THP –0.0024*** –0.0024** –0.0017**
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008)
Games played by all team players 0.0010** 0.0003 0.0004
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Payroll (in 106) – 0.0212*** 0.0179***
(0.0055) (0.0047)
Players used within season – –0.0461*** –0.0429***
(0.0057) (0.0072)
Team fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes
Manager fixed-effects No No Yes
Observations 897 694 694
Notes: The dependent variable is a team’s (logarithmic) regular season winning percentage. All independent
variables are measured relative to their league averages in a season. Robust standard errors that have been adjusted
for clustering at the team level are given in parentheses. All estimations also included a constant (not reported). *,
**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
of managers into the use of social ties as an acquisition practice, because manager
fixed-effects in Model (M3) serve as control for each manager’s time-invariant “qual-
ity type”.
We find that the effect of tie-hired-players on team performance is large: on av-
erage, each tie-hired-player plays approximately 36.5 games per season. According to
our estimates from Model (M3), the on-court use of one such tie-hired-player results
in a 5.2 percent reduction in the regular season winning percentage. For the 50 teams
that barely made the playoffs in our sample by claiming the 8th spot in their confer-
ences, this would have resulted in 2.1 fewer regular season wins. In 64 percent of the
seasons in our sample, this difference in wins would have been sufficient to drive the
team ranked 8th in its conference to 9th place (thereby missing the playoffs). This
finding implies that the impact of social ties on the hiring behavior of managers can
be crucial for making the playoffs.
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5.3 Alternative explanations for the negative performance
effect
While our main finding is perfectly in line with the predictions of agency theory, other
explanations may come to mind. For example, in spite of the negative short-term per-
formance, tie-hired-players might be good long-term investments. Another possibility
could be that managers use their social ties to realize non-sporting benefits for the
team. If this was true, our focus on sporting performance might give a downward
biased view on the benefits of tie-hired-players.
According to the view that tie-hired-players are good long-term investments, man-
agers might use their social ties to acquire players, so called “diamonds-in-the-rough”
that have great upside potential, but need some time to develop. Such hiring decisions
are beneficial to the team, if their negative performance effect in the first year is more
than offset by positive performance effects over the following years of their contract.
To address this possibility, we perform another analysis in which we re-classify a player
as a tie-hired-player if his current team acquired him via a social tie, and if he is still
under his initial contract with that team. Note that this measure includes all tie-
hired-players as in our main specification but also includes tie-hired-players that have
already been with the team for more than one season. As Table 3, Panel A shows, the
associated coefficient on the game appearances of such “long-term tie-hired-players”
remains negative and statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Overall, this
finding contradicts the notion that the use of social ties in player acquisitions leads
to superior team performance in the longer-run.
Alternatively, it could be that managers use their social ties in acquisition decisions
as a means to create non-sporting benefits for the team. To address this possibility,
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Table 3
Alternative explanations for the negative performance effect.
Panel A: THP as long-term investments? (THP re-definition)
Variables OLS (1986–2011)
Games played by THP (complete contract) –0.0015* (0.0008)
Observations 694
Panel B: good value for money? (salaries of free-agents)
Variables OLS (1986–2011)
Social tie (dummy) 0.0488 (0.1738)
Observations 835
Notes: In Panel A, the dependent variable is a team’s (logarithmic) regular season winning percentage. The
estimation included all control variables as Model (M3) in Table 2. Robust standard errors that have been adjusted
for clustering at the team level are given in parentheses. In Panel B, the dependent variable is a player’s (logarithmic,
inflation-adjusted) salary. The estimation included controls for player age, experience, past performance and salary,
as well as fixed-effects for position, and team. Robust standard errors that have been adjusted for clustering on the
player level are given in parentheses. All estimations also included a constant (not reported). *, **, and *** denote
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
we consider a key non-sporting benefit: a player’s reduced monetary wage cost. To
determine the effect of manager social ties on player wage costs, we focus on players
that were acquired as free-agents. The reason for this restriction is that for traded
players, the acquiring team continues to pay the same salary that the player used to
receive from his previous team. Instead, the salary of a free-agent can be freely negoti-
ated between the player and his new team. In Table 3, Panel B shows the results from
a Mincer-type wage regression model, in which we model a free-agent’s (logarithmic,
inflation-adjusted) salary payment as a function of his age, experience, past perfor-
mance and salary, as well as fixed-effects for position, and team. Importantly, we also
include a variable that indicates whether the player was acquired from a socially tied
team of the manager. As our results show, we do not find any significant influence
from a social tie being involved on the players’ salary level.
The lack of an empirical relationship between social ties and a player’s salary level
helps to rule out two additional alternative explanations that might come to mind.23
23We are grateful to an anonymous referee for bringing these explanations to our attention.
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First, social ties might give rise to exaggerated perceptions of player ability as a form
of cognitive bias. Second, managers might view acquisitions through social ties as less
risky. While the underlying mechanisms differ, both explanations imply that managers
should have a higher willingness to pay for free-agents that they acquire through social
ties (conditional on observable characteristics) than for free-agents that they acquire
from unrelated teams. As already mentioned, however, the result in Table 3, Panel B
does not provide evidence for this prediction.
5.4 Extended analysis: monitoring incentives and the perfor-
mance effect
We now aim to test more directly whether the use of social ties in hiring decisions
represents deliberate opportunistic behavior by managers.24 Our test is based on the
idea that if managers maximize utility taking into account private benefits that stem
from interactions with former employers, we expect that this type of opportunistic
behavior should be more pronounced when monitoring by the team owner is weak.
As a consequence, tie-hired-players should be most detrimental to team performance
if they were acquired under weak monitoring.
To test this prediction, we assume that a manager faces weaker monitoring if he
has personally been hired by his owner than if he has been hired by a previous team
owner. For example, the literature on emotional costs of failure asserts, “greater nega-
tive emotions are generated when one’s own decision “causes” the onset of the negative
24Alternatively, it could be that managers wish to benefit the team with tie-hired-players but mistakenly make poor
decisions for the team. For example, previous work has highlighted that the external social ties of decision makers
can harm firm performance due to poor decision-making in response to a heightened sense of trust between socially
tied actors, familiarity bias, or social conformity and groupthink (e.g., Ishii & Xuan, 2014). Similarly, social capital
theorists have long acknowledged that decision makers can become overly embedded in social networks, which
reduces opportunities for collaboration (Granovetter, 1985), because network contacts feel obliged to assist each
other (rather than members outside the social network).
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outcome rather than when others make that decision” (Shepherd et al., 2009). This
observation implies that an owner who personally hired a (bad) manager faces greater
negative emotional costs from replacing this manager. In anticipation of these costs,
the owner might deliberately reduce the “detection probability” of a bad manager by
reducing his monitoring activity. In a similar vein, the literature on the escalation
of commitment has shown that supervisors change their employee performance eval-
uation upwards when they were directly included in the hiring decision and agreed
with the selection of the candidate (Schoorman, 1988). Our data provide support for
this idea: as new owners collect more and more information over time, the share of
pre-installed managers that have been replaced increases from 48 percent in the first
year to 58, and 63 percent after two and three years, respectively.
Therefore, we re-estimate Eq. (1) but distinguish between tie-hired-players that
were acquired by managers under weak monitoring, and tie-hired-players that were
acquired by managers under strong monitoring. Note that the difference between
weak and strong monitoring stems from the order of individuals’ arrivals at the team:
under weak monitoring, the manager arrived after the current owner, while under
strong monitoring, the manager arrived before the current owner. Table 4 displays
the associated estimation results. In line with our prediction, we find a statistically
significant, negative performance effect of tie-hired-players that were acquired under
weak monitoring. In contrast, we do not find a statistically significant effect from
tie-hired-players that were acquired under strong monitoring. An F -test supports the
impression that the coefficients for tie-hired-players across the two monitoring regimes
are significantly different (F = 4.58, p < 0.05). Our data shows that this finding does
not simply reflect reverse causality between ownership changes and team performance:
in the year before the arrival of a new owner, a team wins about 46 percent of its
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Table 4
The effect of the use of tie-hired-players (THP): indeed an agency conflict?
Variables OLS (1986–2011)
Games played by THP –0.0020**
(acquired under weak monitoring) (0.0008)
Games played by THP –0.0002
(acquired under strong monitoring) (0.0006)
Games played by all team players 0.0004
(0.0005)
Payroll (in 106) 0.0180***
(0.0047)
Players used within season –0.0433***
(0.0073)
Team fixed-effects Yes
Manager fixed-effects Yes
Observations 694
Notes: The dependent variable is a team’s (logarithmic) regular season winning percentage. All independent
variables are measured relative to their league averages in a season. Robust standard errors that have been adjusted
for clustering at the team level are given in parentheses. All estimations also included a constant (not reported). *,
**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
games, which is the same as its average winning percentage in all previous years under
the original owner.
Overall, these additional findings make it unlikely that behavioral biases (such as
familiarity bias, excessive trust, or distorted perceptions of player ability and acquisi-
tion risks) or overembeddedness of managers are the predominant mechanism behind
the negative performance effect. Instead, we take our findings as evidence that, in line
with the prediction of agency theory, managers trade off private benefits against team
performance. As expected, managers are less likely to engage in such moral hazard
behavior if properly monitored by the owner.
5.5 Exploiting institutional feature: addressing endogeneity
As with all non-experimental studies there exist reasons to be concerned about en-
dogeneity bias as a source for our findings. For example, McDonald and Westphal
(2003) show that decision makers have a greater tendency to rely on their social ties
when firm performance is already low. This poses a potential adverse selection prob-
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lem for our analysis, because teams frequently acquire players after the beginning of a
new season. Specifically, it could be that the negative performance effect of tie-hired-
players reflects exclusively on the poor performance that teams already showed before
they acquired these players. In this subsection we use two different specifications to
address this potential concern.
In the first specification, we exploit an institutional feature of the NBA, namely
that seasons in the NBA are divided into a foregoing off-season period between June
and October (when team preparation occurs) and a playing period beginning in
November. Teams usually acquire their players during the off-season but are al-
lowed to make roster adjustments during the playing period. In the following, we
focus only on off-season tie-hired-players and exclude all tie-hired-players who were
acquired after the beginning of the playing season. This chronological separation
of hiring decisions and the performance generating mechanism (the games) implies
that off-season tie-hired-players cannot reflect low performance early in the season.
Technically speaking, the timely separation implies that the number of off-season tie-
hired-players is predetermined in the team performance regression. In Table 5, Model
(E1) displays estimation results when we re-estimate Eq. (1) by only considering
games played by off-season tie-hired-players. While the reduction in the number of
tie-hired-players leads to a reduction in statistical significance, we still find a negative
performance effect that is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Importantly,
Model (E2) shows that this negative performance effect stems exclusively from tie-
hired-players that were acquired under weak monitoring. Again, an F -test shows that
the coefficients for tie-hired-players across the two monitoring regimes are significantly
different (F = 6.99, p < 0.05).
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Table 5
Tests for endogeneity: off-season THP and team performance.
Variables OLS OLS OLS OLS
E1 E2 E3 E4
(1986–2011) (1986–2011) (1986–2011) (1986–2011)
Games played by off-season THP –0.0022* – –0.0012 –
(0.0011) (0.0009)
Games played by off-season THP – –0.0027** – –0.0018**
(acquired under weak monitoring) (0.0011) (0.0008)
Games played by off-season THP – 0.0004 – 0.0012*
(acquired under strong monitoring) (0.0010) (0.0007)
Games played by all team players 0.0004 0.0003 0.0007* 0.0007*
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Payroll (in 106) 0.0180*** 0.0151*** 0.0096** 0.0097**
(0.0047) (0.0046) (0.0037) (0.0037)
Players used within season –0.0433*** –0.0410*** –0.0417*** –0.0422***
(0.0072) (0.0073) (0.0068) (0.0069)
Lagged team winning percentage (s−1) No No Yes Yes
Team fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Manager fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 694 694 689 689
Notes: Displayed are estimation results for extended versions of Eq. (1). The dependent variable is a team’s
(logarithmic) regular season winning percentage. All independent variables are measured relative to their league
averages in a season. Robust standard errors that have been adjusted for clustering at the team level are given in
parentheses. All estimations also included a constant (not reported). The difference in observations between models
E1/E2 and E3/E4 relates to the exclusion of five expansion teams’ first-year observations (for which a lagged winning
percentage is not available). *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
In the second specification, we acknowledge that off-season tie-hired-players may
partly reflect on the team’s sporting performance in the previous season (Moliterno &
Wiersema, 2007). This poses a problem for our estimation whenever a team’s sporting
performance is considerably lower than its long-term average (which is reflected in the
team fixed-effects). Therefore, we also estimate two models, in which we control for
a team’s lagged winning percentage from the previous season (s − 1). In Table 5,
Model (E3) reveals that this variable reduces the statistical significance of tie-hired-
players’ game appearances. While we still find a negative performance effect in this
model, the effect becomes marginally insignificant (p = 0.176). However, Model
(E4) provides a simple explanation for this reduction in statistical significance: when
controlling for a team’s lagged winning percentage, the negative coefficient on tie-
hired-players under weak monitoring is still statistically significant at the 5 percent
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level, but reduces in size (in absolute terms). In contrast, the positive coefficient on
tie-hired-players under strong monitoring increases relative to Model (E2) and even
becomes statistically significant. Accordingly, an F -test strongly rejects the coefficient
equality for tie-hired-players across monitoring regimes (F = 14.18, p < 0.01). Taken
together, these findings imply that the pooled measure in (E3) must lose statistical
significance relative to our findings in Model (E1). We emphasize that while the
positive, statistically significant effect from tie-hired-players under strong monitoring
seems to support the prediction from social capital theory that the use of social ties
can benefit the firm, this finding depends critically on the monitoring incentives for
the owner. In addition, some caution seems to be in order as the coefficient is only
marginally significant (p = 0.099).
Overall, the evidence from these two additional specifications that pose much less
scope for endogeneity bias confirms that the reason behind the negative performance
effect of tie-hired-players lies in the lack of sufficiently strong monitoring from team
owners.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide industry-wide evidence on the overall performance effect
of employees’ use of external strong social ties to others outside the firm. We focus
on external social ties to a prominent group of firm outsiders: colleagues at a former
employer in the same industry. The fact that such ties are usually strong ties, which
persist beyond shared co-working experiences makes them potentially very influential
for firm-level decisions. An important question for firms is therefore whether ties to
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former employers should be expected to interfere with the selection of transaction
partners in decision-making on behalf of the firm.
We add to the existing knowledge by providing an analysis of a unique, naturally
occurring panel field data set that provides a rare opportunity to determine the rel-
evance of employees’ external social ties for firm-level decision-making in the field.
Based on the complete transaction history between all teams in the National Basket-
ball Association in its current form (34 years), we show that a manager’s external,
social ties to his past (employers) can harm team performance in the present. The
effect is large: controlling for a team’s budget and other characteristics, the average
tie-hired-player reduces team performance by about 5 percent. We also find that the
negative performance effect is entirely driven by managers under team owners with
low monitoring incentives. These findings lend support to the idea that – in the ab-
sence of appropriate performance incentives – network-based incentives can sometimes
undermine firm-level objectives.
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Appendix
In this appendix, we consider two extensions of our social tie measure. In the first
extension, we include a manager’s history as manager and coach, as it is not unusual
for a manager in the NBA to have formerly worked as a coach with other teams. In
the second extension, we acknowledge the possibility that a manager may maintain
social ties to his former employers via connections to former colleagues on other levels
than coach, manager or owner level.
While we believe that a manager’s ties to former colleagues at these latter levels
are most valuable for player acquisition decisions, we emphasize that this extension
provides additional credibility to our findings as it considerably extends the number of
tie-hired-players in our sample from N = 72 in the main text to N = 100 (Extension
1) and N = 190 (Extension 2). However, in constructing this second extension, we
face the considerable challenge that complete information on each employee’s working
history in the NBA is unavailable. Therefore, we assume that a manager has a social
tie to another team if he has previously worked as either a manager or coach for
that team, irrespective of whether his former colleagues on the coach, manager, or
owner level are still with that team. Note that this second extended measure is
potentially much more noisy than the measure in our main specification, which is due
to the unobservability of social ties to colleagues on other levels. Table A.1 provides
summary statistics for both extended measures.
Table A.2 presents estimation results when we replicate our main regression anal-
yses with the extended sets of tie-hired-players, and shows that our key findings are
robust to the use of both extensions: besides a statistically significant, negative per-
formance effect of tie-hired-players (Models MA1 and MA3), we also continue to find
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that only tie-hired-players that were acquired under weak monitoring reduce team
performance (Models MA2 and MA4).
Table A.1
Summary statistics: extended social tie measures.
Variables Mean Std.dev. Min. Max. N
Panel A: active ties (including manager’s history as coach)
Team level
Team uses tie-hired-player (dummy) 0.082 0.274 0 1 908
Games played by tie-hired-players 47.892 44.422 0 194 74
Manager level (all managers)
Potential for tie-hiring decisions (over career) 2.085 4.252 0 20 141
Number of tie-hiring decisions (over career) 0.709 1.641 0 10 141
Number of hiring decisions (over career) 40.830 35.298 3 186 141
Share of tie-hiring decisions 0.017 0.052 0 0.50 141
Career length (years) 6.440 5.626 1 25 141
Manager level (managers with social ties in years with social ties)
Potential for tie-hiring decisions 6.255 5.326 1 20 47
Number of tie-hiring decisions 2.000 2.303 0 10 47
Number of hiring decisions 37.851 28.532 4 124 47
Share of tie-hiring decisions 0.060 0.084 0 0.50 47
Career years with social ties 5.362 4.245 1 17 47
Panel B: active ties and non-active ties (including manager’s history as coach)
Team level
Team uses tie-hired-player (dummy) 0.139 0.346 0 1 908
Games played by tie-hired-players 48.690 43.577 0 194 126
Manager level (all managers)
Potential for tie-hiring decisions (over career) 3.773 6.725 0 39 141
Number of tie-hiring decisions (over career) 1.348 2.826 0 20 141
Number of hiring decisions (over career) 40.830 35.298 3 186 141
Share of tie-hiring decisions 0.031 0.064 0 0.50 141
Career length (years) 6.440 5.626 1 25 141
Manager level (managers with social ties in years with social ties)
Potential for tie-hiring decisions 8.185 7.890 1 39 65
Number of tie-hiring decisions 2.892 3.597 0 20 65
Number of hiring decisions 40.569 30.889 4 139 65
Share of tie-hiring decisions 0.074 0.081 0 0.50 65
Career years with social ties 6.277 6.061 1 22 65
Notes: Displayed statistics are for the 1977/78–2010/11 seasons.
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Table A.2
The performance effect of tie-hired-players (THP): extended social tie measures.
Variables Extension 1 Extension 2
OLS OLS OLS OLS
MA1 MA2 MA3 MA4
Games played by THP –0.0013** – –0.0009* –
(0.0005) (0.0005)
Games played by THP – –0.0015*** – –0.0012***
(acquired under weak monitoring) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Games played by THP – 0.00001 – 0.0003
(acquired under strong monitoring) (0.0008) (0.0009)
Games played by all team players 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Payroll (in 106) 0.0180*** 0.0181*** 0.0181*** 0.0181***
(0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047)
Players used within season –0.0427*** –0.0431*** –0.0427*** –0.0425***
(0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0074) (0.0074)
Team fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Manager fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 694 694 694 694
Notes: The displayed estimation results follow our core estimation model (Eq. (1)). The dependent variable is
a team’s (logarithmic) regular season winning percentage. All independent variables are measured relative to their
league averages in a season. Robust standard errors that have been adjusted for clustering at the team level are given
in parentheses. All estimations also included a constant (not reported). *, **, and *** denote statistical significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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A.2
Tie-transfers and player performance
in professional soccer∗
Abstract
In this paper, we document empirical evidence on how a past working rela-
tionship between coach and player affects the quality of the transfer decisions
made by professional soccer clubs. Using employment records to identify past
ties between coaches and players, we analyse 19 years of transfer decisions from
clubs in the German Bundesliga and show that players acquired through tie-
transfers outperform players acquired through market-transfers by 3 percent.
However, we also show that not all tie-transfers are equally desirable. Extended
analyses reveal that tie-transfers where a new coach brings a player straight
from his previous club result in an underperformance of the newly acquired
players of almost 8 percent. Taken together, our findings imply that referrals
from coaches can both improve and worsen the quality of clubs’ transfer de-
cisions and that the contextual factors are crucial for an effective use of such
referral-hiring practices.
JEL Classification: L83; D82; M51
Keywords: soccer; transfer; player performance; coach; ties
∗This paper has been written jointly with Raphael Flepp and Egon Franck.
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1 Introduction
The global transfer market in professional soccer has become big business in the last
few decades, as clubs have exhibited ever greater efforts to improve their competitive
position through player transfers. Nowadays, clubs pay gigantic transfer fees to sign
players that are in running contracts with other clubs. For the year 2013, the FIFA
Transfer Matching System recorded total transfer fees of e2.8 billion for international
transfers alone (FIFA TMS, 2014). Related figures from UEFA show that some top
European clubs, such as Real Madrid, Barcelona and Manchester United, each have
a current squad that has cost them more than e250 million in transfer fees (UEFA,
2014). Given these enormous investments, the optimization of every transfer is crucial
for professional soccer clubs.
While plenty of information on soccer players is publicly available to all the clubs
in the market, including historical club affiliations, match appearances, and a wide
range of performance statistics, decision-making in the transfer market involves many
poorly known factors, such as game intelligence, playing style and suitability for the
team’s playing style, personality and ability to mesh with team-mates and coaches
(see the discussion in Weinberg, 2014). To gain a competitive advantage over other
clubs in the competition, clubs have to incorporate hidden information about players
into their decision-making in the transfer market.
A historically evolved concept for a club to do so is to rely on its coach1 as an infor-
mation source. The coach works together with the players on a daily basis and thereby
gathers first-hand information about their capabilities. As both coaches and players
1In this paper, the term “coach” is used to refer to the employee of a club who holds responsibility for devising team
tactics and strategies, line-up selection, and the coaching and training of players. This terminology is common in
most European soccer leagues and in the major sports leagues in the United States. However, well-known exceptions
are the English soccer leagues where the employee of a club with responsibility for first-team playing matters is
usually called “manager” (Dobson & Goddard, 2011).
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move among different clubs during the course of their professional careers, coaches
stockpile information about many players in the market. Accordingly, ties between
coaches and players created by a past working relationship constitute a valuable re-
source for clubs which can be incorporated into transfer decisions. An illustrative
example is FC Bayern Munich’s signing of Thiago Alcántara in summer 2013, Bay-
ern’s coach Pep Guardiola having previously worked with the player at FC Barcelona.
Arguably, clubs should be able to realize benefits from using such coach–player ties
in transfer decisions, as they allow for the mitigation of substantial search frictions in
the recruitment of players (see the discussion in Jackson, 2010). However, a beneficial
use of coach–player ties strongly depends on the ability of coaches to screen their player
network effectively. Existing evidence on job referrals indicates that this ability cannot
be taken for granted: creating short-term jobs in a field experiment, Beaman and
Magruder (2012) have found that many employees are not able to make good referrals
even when they are properly incentivized to refer high-ability workers. Beaman and
Magruder concluded that not all employees can screen effectively for their employers
because they simply do not have a good understanding of which network members
will perform better.
In this paper, we document the first empirical evidence on how ties between coaches
and players affect the quality of transfer decisions made by professional soccer clubs.
To do so, we construct a novel data set on transfers in the German Bundesliga from
the seasons 1995/96 to 2013/2014. First, we compare publicly available information
on the employment records of coaches and players to identify all transfers where
coach and player have previously worked together. Such “tie-transfers” comprise 6.8
percent of all transfers in the given time period. Second, to address the quality of
transfer decisions, we extend our data set with external expert evaluations on the
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performance of newly acquired players.2 This novel data set enables us to investigate
whether players acquired through tie-transfers outperform players acquired through
ordinary “market-transfers”.
The empirical analysis of 2,313 transfer decisions in our sample reveals that the
effect of tie-transfers on the performance of newly acquired players is positive, over-
all. Based on a simple mean comparison, we find that players acquired through tie-
transfers outperform players acquired through market-transfers by 3.9 percent. Sub-
sequent regression analyses reveal that this difference stems from the coach–player tie
to a large extent and not from quality differences of players, clubs or coaches. Con-
trolling for the transfer fee, club fixed-effects, and coach fixed-effects, the performance
benefit of tie-transfers is 3.3 percent.
In extended analyses, we investigate whether the effect of tie-transfers depends
on more detailed contextual factors. We do so for two reasons: first, research on
social networks indicates that tie-benefits can diminish at an alarming rate because
the related information is often short-lived and fades quickly (Soda, Usai, & Zaheer,
2004; Burt, 2002). If this view is true in our setting, ties where coach and player have
worked together more recently should yield higher quality transfer decisions than
those from longer ago. Second, several potential benefits from tie-transfers critically
depend on how well the coach knows the players and working environment at his
current club (e.g., how well a player fits into the playing style of a team or how well a
player meshes with new team-mates). Therefore, tie-transfers involving newly arrived
coaches should be less effective, as they can only realize those benefits that stem from
2In particular, we draw on expert evaluations from the German soccer magazine Kicker which are well-established in
economic research on professional soccer (see e.g., Bryson, Frick, & Simmons, 2013; Baumann, Friehe, & Wedow,
2011; Franck & Nüesch, 2010).
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player capabilities largely independent of the specific club context (e.g., personality
attributes, game intelligence).
Based on a distinction between new and established coaches and a distinction
between recent and past ties, we present extended estimations for four subgroups of
tie-transfers. Our extended estimations reveal that tie-transfers critically depend on
a coach that is already well established at a club. While players acquired through
tie-transfers involving an established coach consistently outperform players acquired
through market-transfers, tie-transfers involving a new coach are less successful. With
a new coach and a past tie, the positive effect of tie-transfers becomes insignificant and
with a new coach and a recent tie, the effect of tie-transfers even becomes negative. We
emphasize that these differences between the subgroups cannot simply reflect initial
problems of newly arrived coaches, because we control for the working experience of
a coach at the current club in all our estimations.
That tie-transfers involving new coaches and recent ties should yield poorer per-
formance is puzzling at first sight, because it seems unlikely that a coach would delib-
erately use his tie to a player to end up with an inferior transfer decision. However, an
emerging strand of empirical literature indicates that personal ties between individu-
als can lead to flawed decision-making (see e.g., Ishii & Xuan, 2014; Fracassi & Tate,
2012; Bandiera, Barankay, & Rasul, 2009; Brandes, Brechot, & Franck, 2015). Most
notably, recent evidence from financial economics shows that personal ties between
firm directors in mergers can lead to lower value creation. It is argued that directors’
tie-influenced decision-making is sometimes flawed in response to familiarity biases, a
heightened sense of trust, or social conformity and groupthink (Ishii & Xuan, 2014).
The observed underperformance of players acquired through tie-transfers in the
context of new coaches and recent ties may indicate similar behavioral biases. While
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coaches desire influence on transfer decisions to achieve sporting success for their
clubs’, and ultimately their own, interests, their referrals can turn out to be poor.
Starting at a new club could tempt coaches to target players they have recently worked
with because they prefer familiar players around them. Moreover, a heightened sense
of trust could lead to a more favorable judgement of players with which coaches
have recently worked. The combination of both behaviors can provide a reasonable
explanation why tie-transfers lead to a negative effect on the performance of newly
acquired players under certain conditions.
We structure this paper as follows. In Section 2, we provide a brief background
on player transfers in professional soccer. In Section 3, we outline our research hy-
potheses. Section 4 presents the data and method. Section 5 includes the empirical
analysis, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Background information on player transfers
To follow the analysis in this paper, it is important to have some background on
the peculiarities of player transfers in professional soccer and on the involvement of
coaches in clubs’ transfer decisions. In this section, we therefore briefly discuss basic
regulations of the transfer market and the recruitment process of professional soccer
clubs.
A player transfer in professional soccer refers to the movement of a player’s regis-
tration from one club to another and is widely regulated by the world governing body
of soccer, the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA).3 Among other
things, the regulations specify transfer windows in which players are allowed to move
3While international transfers are under full responsibility of the FIFA regulations, associations at the national level
can issue a defined range of country-specific regulations for domestic transfers (FIFA, 2012, p. 7).
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and different transfer types for moving from one club to another (FIFA, 2012). In
terms of the transfer windows, there are two fixed periods during a season. The first
transfer window opens right after the end of a season and closes before the start of
the next season. This period may not exceed 12 weeks. The second transfer win-
dow occurs in the middle of the season and may not exceed four weeks. Looking at
Europe’s “big five” soccer leagues4, transfer activities are highly concentrated in the
first transfer window, when more than 80 percent of transfer spendings occur (UEFA,
2012).
In terms of the transfer types for moving from one club to another, three different
types can be identified (FIFA TMS, 2014). First, a club can hire a player as a “free-
agent” if his contract with the releasing club has expired. This transfer type does
not require a transfer agreement between the acquiring club and the releasing club.5
Second, a club can “buy” a player who is in a running contract with the releasing
club. Such transfers are based on the agreement of all parties, as the player moves
into a new employment contract with the acquiring club. Normally, this transfer type
includes a transfer fee paid by the acquiring club to the releasing club. Third, a club
can transfer a player for a defined time-period in a “loan” transfer while remaining
in a running contract with the former club.6 In this transfer type, the employment
contract with the acquiring club is only of temporary nature and the loan arrangement
may include a lending fee.
4Europe’s “big five” soccer leagues include the the English Premier League, the German Bundesliga, the Spanish
Primera Division, the Italian Serie A, and the French Ligue 1. These leagues are responsible for about 65 percent of
all global transfer spendings and thereby account for almost two-thirds of the overall market size (FIFA TMS, 2014).
5Prior to 1995, clubs in professional soccer in Europe were allowed to collect transfer fees for players with expiring
contracts. However, these transfer fees were eliminated by the Bosman-Ruling of the European Court of Justice in
1995 (see e.g., Binder & Findlay, 2012; Frick, 2009). Because our analysis starts as recently as the season 1995/96,
we do not present a further discussion of this regulation change.
6Since a player moves back to his former club after an ended loan arrangement, “return from loan” is an additional
(fourth) transfer type (FIFA TMS, 2014, p. 50). However, as this transfer type includes an automatic moving back
of the player to the former club and no proactive transfer decision, we do not consider such player movement as a
transfer in our analysis.
58
While the aforementioned regulations refer to formal aspects of transfers only,
the process by which clubs recruit new players includes many informal aspects. Put
as simply as possible, a transfer occurs if a club reasons that a player will benefit
the team more than any other available player in the market (under given budget
constraints) and if the player values a club’s offer higher than offers from all other
interested clubs in the market (based on expected future payoff streams).
Clubs identify transfer targets using multiple employees in distinct and comple-
mentary roles: scouts, analysts, sporting directors, and coaches can all be involved in
making a transfer possible (Poli, 2010). Scouts trek around soccer stadia and pitches
nation- and worldwide to gather in-depth information about players that are widely
unknown to a club. Analysts comb large databases of player metrics to come up with
transfer prospects. Sporting directors7 have the connections to player agents and clubs
and thereby have broader access to the transfer market. Usually, a sporting director
also assumes the main responsibility for all negotiations with players and their agents.
Finally, coaches can make referrals (as they hold information about many players in
the market from working with and playing against them in the past) and have a strong
vote in final transfer decisions.8
While the specific involvement of most actors in the recruitment process cannot
be tracked precisely, the influence of one actor, namely the coach, is manifest in one
certain transfer case: decisions on players who are directly known to a coach from
previously working together at the same club. Although the level of involvement of
7In professional sports, there are several alternative job titles for the role of the “sporting director”: e.g., “general
manager” in the major sports leagues in the United States and “director of football” in the English soccer leagues.
8Of course, the initiator of a transfer may not only be a club proactively attempting to improve the playing quality
of the current squad but also a player dissatisfied with prospects at his current club who seeks better opportunities
elsewhere (Carmichael, Forrest, & Simmons, 1999). To do so, players usually engage agents who introduce them to
clubs with a view to negotiating employment contracts and who conclude transfer agreements between the clubs if
needed (FIFA, 2008). However, unlike to many other aspects of professional soccer, details on the activities of the
so-called player agents are not generally publicly available.
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coaches in player recruitment can vary from club to club (Dobson & Goddard, 2011),
it is almost certain that coaches are at least consulted on the recruitment of players
with whom they have worked before.
3 Research hypotheses
Ties between coaches and players created by a past working relationship are a valuable
resource for decision-making in the transfer market. First, the past working relation-
ship creates a personal tie between a coach and a player that includes informational
advantages as well as superior access. Second, such ties between coaches and players
emerge as a mere by-product of the co-working experiences and clubs do not have to
specifically invest in them. Third, a coach has strong incentives to make his personal
ties available in the recruitment process in order to enhance transfer decisions, because
the threat of getting fired in response to poor sporting performance is a very powerful
disciplinary mechanism in the labor market for soccer coaches (see e.g., D’Addona &
Kind, 2014; De Paola & Scoppa, 2012; Barros, Frick, & Passos, 2009). Considered to-
gether, ties between coaches and players created by a past working relationship should
allow clubs to reduce the unknowns in transfer decisions and to improve the quality of
transfer decisions. Therefore, we predict that players acquired through tie-transfers
outperform players acquired through market-transfers.
Our prediction on ties between coaches and players created by a past working
relationship is closely related to theory on the referral-hiring phenomenon. Following
Fernandez, Castilla, and Moore (2000), we see three analytically distinct ways by
which clubs can realize benefits from hiring through their coaches’ player networks.
First, coach–player ties expand a club’s recruitment horizon and tap into pools of
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players who would otherwise not be available. Second, coach–player ties provide
informational advantages, as they pass on extra, hard-to-measure information about
players and their specific fit into the current team. Third, coach–player ties might
ease the transition of a player into a new club and team structure in the post hire
period because of the past co-working experience with the coach. All three processes
acquire players who will outperform those obtained in market-transfers (where no
prior coach–player tie exists).
However, we suggest that the potential of previous coach–player ties to enhance
the quality of transfer decisions is likely to vary with contextual factors. First, one can
ask whether the time lag between the tie and the transfer affects the benefits of tie-
transfers, because compelling evidence from network research indicates that benefits
decay quickly. For example, a study on past collaboration in the television production
industry found that network benefits derived from “bridging ties” diminish rapidly
because the relevance of the information is often short-lived (Soda et al., 2004).9
Similarly, a study on networks in the banking industry showed that bridging ties tend
to fade within two years because of the high opportunity costs of maintaining them
(Burt, 2002). This logic suggests that the associated benefits of tie-transfers should
be more pronounced with more recent ties than with ties from longer ago.
Second, one can ask whether the benefits of tie-transfers hinge on a coach being
already well established at his current club. The high reciprocal interdependence
of players in the sport of soccer (see the discussion in Keidell, 1987) suggests that a
coach needs detailed understanding of the existing team structure to integrate a player
9Bridging ties are ties that connect individuals existing in different social spheres that would not be connected otherwise
(see e.g., McEvily, Jaffee, & Tortoriello, 2012; McEvily & Zaheer, 1999). In that sense, a tie between a coach and a
player created by a past working relationship constitutes a bridging ties if it provides information that would otherwise
not be available to the focal club. McEvily and Zaheer (1999) argue that such bridging ties can be simultaneously
nonredundant and trusted.
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known from the past successfully. Otherwise, coach–player ties may not unleash
their full potential, as the lack of working experience with the current team limits
any informational advantages that relate to the fit of a player into the specific team
structure. Accordingly, we argue that tie-transfers involving a new coach should be
less beneficial than tie-transfers involving a coach that is already established.
The aforementioned arguments can be displayed in a 2x2 matrix with four sub-
groups of tie-transfers (see Table 1). The four subgroups can be described by stereo-
typical cases. First, a new coach brings in a player he worked with some time ago.
Second, a new coach brings in a player directly from his previous club. Third, an
established coach calls a player he worked with some time ago. Fourth, an established
coach recalls a player who had left the club recently. We expect that benefits of tie-
transfers are least pronounced in the case of a new coach and a past tie, because of
the diminished relevance of the information acquired through the tie and the lack of
knowledge of the existing team structure (H1). In contrast, we expect that benefits
of tie-transfers are most pronounced in the case of an established coach and a recent
tie, because of the high relevance of the information acquired through the tie and the
availability of knowledge of the existing team structure (H4). For the other two cases,
H2 and H3, we expect to observe benefits with strength intermediate between those
of H1 and H4.
4 Data and method
To test our hypotheses, we have created a novel data set on all player transfers in
the German Bundesliga from 1995/96 until 2013/14. For each transfer in this time-
period, our data set includes information on the player being transferred, information
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Table 1
Decomposition of tie-transfers into four subgroups.
Coach entry
Tie decay New coach Established coach
Past tie
Stereotypical case:
New coach brings in
a player he worked
with some time ago
(H1: +)
Stereotypical case:
Established coach calls
a player he worked with
some time ago
(H3: ++)
Recent tie
Stereotypical case:
New coach brings in
a player directly from
his previous club
(H2: ++)
Stereotypical case:
Established coach recalls
a player who had left the
club recently
(H4: +++)
on the acquiring and releasing clubs, information on the transfer, and information on
the coach of the acquiring club. We have combined this data with a comparison of
the complete professional careers of coaches and players involved that allows us to
identify all tie-transfers in the given time-period. We obtained all this information
from www.transfermarkt.de, a website that specializes in the free publication of soccer
data. Finally, we have completed our data set by adding expert evaluations from the
German soccer magazine Kicker as a measure of the individual performance of each
newly acquired player.
In the following subsections, we describe how the collected data was used to con-
struct the dependent and key explanatory variables and to test our hypotheses.
4.1 Dependent variable
Our dependent variable is the individual performance of the newly acquired player
in the season of his transfer. To measure individual player performance, we draw
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on expert evaluations from the German soccer magazine Kicker. Sport experts from
Kicker consistently evaluate the individual match performance of players using the
German school grading scale that varies between 1.0 (excellent) and 6.0 (very bad).
Each match is attended by two trained representatives of Kicker who are experts for
the respective teams and who can use additional TV footage in the grading process
(Baumann et al., 2011). Importantly, such expert evaluations can take intra-team
spillover effects into account when judging the individual contribution of a player in
the team production (Franck & Nüesch, 2010). Therefore, the grading constitutes a
“composite index” of a player’s performance in a match (Frick, 2007), drawing on both
quantitative statistics (e.g., goals scored, touches of the ball, passes) and qualitative
behaviour on the pitch (e.g., tactical movement, leadership).
To measure the performance of a newly acquired player on the seasonal level, we
use the average grading over all matches in which the player was evaluated.10 To
allow for an easier interpretation, we reverse the original grading so that a grading
of 6.0 indicates an excellent performance and a grading of 1.0 indicates a very bad
performance.
4.2 Key explanatory variables
Our main explanatory variable is a dummy variable that indicates whether the coach
and the player involved in a transfer have previously worked together in a coach–
10To be graded by Kicker’s experts, a player must have played for at least 30 minutes in a match. Therefore, matches
in which a player was substituted on very late or substituted off very early are not considered in the performance
measure. This restriction also creates a minimum requirement for a transfer decision to be included in the sample
of our study. If a newly acquired player played no matches (e.g., because of a long-lasting injury) or played for less
than 30 minutes per match, we were not able to include the transfer decisions because the newly acquired player
was not covered by Kicker’s expert evaluation.
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player relationship during their professional careers.11 If yes, a transfer is considered
a tie-transfer. If not, a transfer is considered a market-transfer.
Additionally, we decomposed the tie-transfer group into four subgroups of tie-
transfers (see 2x2 matrix in Table 1, Section 3). For the operationalization of past and
recent ties, we followed the approach of McEvily et al. (2012) in a study on professional
ties among lawyers in the legal industry. A tie-transfer is defined as involving a recent
tie if the lag between the season in which the coach and player last worked together
and the season of the transfer is no more than one season. Otherwise, a tie-transfer is
defined as involving a past tie. Similarly, we operationalized the distinction between
new and established coaches. A tie-transfer is defined as involving a new coach if the
lag between the season in which the coach started work at the current club and the
season of the transfer is no more than one season. Otherwise, a tie-transfer is defined
as involving an established coach.12
From all tie-transfers that we identified in the German Bundesliga from 1995/96
until 2013/14, cases with established coaches and past ties are most frequent (42.7%),
followed by cases with new coaches and past ties (36.9%) and cases with new coaches
and recent ties (17.2%). Cases with established coaches and recent ties contain a
very small proportion (3.2%), as only players who are recalled to the same club they
recently left can fall into that category. Table A.2 in the Appendix shows a list of all
tie-transfer including details on the subgroup categorization.
11The “professional career” refers to first teams, reserve teams and more senior youth teams of professional clubs.
Working together in amateur clubs and in preadolescent youth teams is not observed in our data.
12We emphasize that our operationalization leads to a rather broad measure of recent ties and new coaches. Due to
the second transfer window in the middle of a season, a lag of one season may represent a real time lag as long as
18 months. However, to test for the sensitivity of our operationalization, we additionally estimated all our models
with two alternative (and more conservative) measures. The additional estimations show that our results remain
qualitatively unchanged if we use real time lags of 12 months and 6 months as cut-off points for recent ties and new
coaches to build the four tie-transfer subgroups (see Appendix, Table A.1).
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4.3 Estimation method
To test whether ties between coaches and players created by a past working relation-
ship have an effect on the quality of transfer decisions, we regress the performance
of newly acquired players on a tie-transfer dummy and a set of control variables for
transfer, player, and coach characteristics. Importantly, we also include club, coach,
and season fixed-effects in the estimations to account for performance effects of unob-
served club and coach quality and (potential) time-trends in our sample period. We
estimate the following model:
performance-gradepcs = β0 + β1 tie-transferpcs+β2Xpcs + αc + αco + αs + εpcs, (1)
where the subscripts p, c, co and s denote players, clubs, coaches and seasons.
Fixed-effects for clubs, coaches and seasons are captured in αc, αco, and αs. The
dependent variable performance-gradepcs is the average grading over all matches of
player p with club c in season s. The variable tie-transferpcs is a dummy variable
that is 1 for tie-transfers and 0 otherwise. The vector of covariates Xpcs captures the
tactical position of a player13, player age, coach tenure (at the time of the transfer),
transfer type (buy, free-agent, loan) and a dummy for international transfers.
Additionally, Xpcs includes the transfer fee paid by the acquiring club to the re-
leasing club in an extended specification. By including the paid transfer fee, we aim to
rule out any selection effects in tie-transfers that relate to the raw talent of a player.
While other proxies of player talent may come to mind (e.g., historical playing statis-
tics, matches with the national team), we are convinced that the transfer fee paid by
13Previous research that draws on Kicker’s expert evaluation has shown that goalkeepers and defenders gain system-
atically higher scores than strikers (Bryson et al., 2013; Baumann et al., 2011). Controlling for the playing position
is therefore important to address potential biases in the performance grading stemming from the different tactical
responsibilities of different positions (Franck & Nüesch, 2010).
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the acquiring club provides a comprehensive proxy of player talent because it reflects
the market price of player.14 However, the inclusion of the transfer fee comes at the
cost of a restricted sample, as this measure is only available for transfers that needed
a termination agreement on the player’s employment contract with the releasing club
(i.e., buy transfers).
For extended analyses of the four tie-transfer subgroups that distinguish between
new and established coaches and recent and past ties, we re-estimate Eq. (1) with
a decomposition of tie-transferpcs into four separate dummy variables. The reference
group for the effect of the decomposed dummy variables is, as before, the market-
transfer group.
5 Empirical analysis
5.1 Summary statistics
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the variables in our data set. In Panel A,
we show the statistics for the full sample. From the 2,313 transfers, 6.8 percent are
identified as tie-transfers. Most of the newly acquired players are midfielders (39.4%),
followed by defenders (28.0%) and strikers (27.2%). Goalkeepers only account for a
small proportion (5.2%). The average age of newly acquired players is 25.5 years and
the average tenure of coaches is 1.9 years at the time (i.e., exact date) of respective
transfers. A little under half the sample are international transfers (46.3%). In terms
14An alternative empirical approach would be to adopt a fixed-effects model on the unit of the newly acquired player,
in which tie-transfers and market-transfers of the same player in different seasons are compared to each other. This
would allow to fully account for unobserved (time-invariant) player talent. However, as only 86 of 1,686 players that
were involved in the transfers of our sample period appear in multiple transfers with variation in the tie-transfer
measure, this approach is less appealing to us. Nevertheless, to account for the fact that some of the newly acquired
players in the data set are involved in multiple transfers, the coefficients’ standard errors in all our estimations have
been adjusted for clustering at the individual player level.
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Table 2
Summary statistics.
Variables Mean Std.dev. Min. Max.
Panel A: all transfers (N = 2,313)
Tie-transfer 0.068 0.252 0 1
Position: Goalkeeper 0.052 0.225 0 1
Position: Defender 0.280 0.449 0 1
Position: Midfielder 0.394 0.489 0 1
Position: Striker 0.272 0.445 0 1
Age of the newly acquired player 25.48 3.810 17 39
Performance-grade of the newly acquired player 3.172 0.517 1 5
Coach tenure (in years) 1.917 2.310 0 13.7
International transfer 0.463 0.498 0 1
Transfer type: buy 0.566 0.496 0 1
Transfer type: free-agent 0.310 0.462 0 1
Transfer type: loan 0.124 0.330 0 1
Panel B: buy transfers (N = 1,197)a
Tie-transfer 0.054 0.227 0 1
Position: Goalkeeper 0.037 0.188 0 1
Position: Defender 0.267 0.443 0 1
Position: Midfielder 0.411 0.492 0 1
Position: Striker 0.285 0.452 0 1
Age of the newly acquired player 24.95 3.538 17 37
Performance-grade of the newly acquired player 3.208 0.498 1 5
Coach tenure (in years) 1.905 2.322 0 13.7
International transfer 0.505 0.500 0 1
Transfer fee (in million e) 2.459 3.824 0.01 40.6
Notes: The data refers to transfers in the German Bundesliga from the seasons 1995/96–2013/14. Data on the
performance of newly acquired players includes expert evaluations by the German soccer magazine Kicker. All other
data is extracted and collected from www.transfermarkt.de.
a113 out of 1,310 buy transfers in Panel A are not included in Panel B because of unavailable transfer fee data.
of the transfer type, buy transfers are the most popular choice (56.6%), followed by
free-agent transfers (31.0%) and loan transfers (12.4%). The average performance
grading of the newly acquired players is 3.172.
In Panel B, we show the summary statistics for a reduced subsample that only
includes buy transfers. In buy transfers, tie-transfers occur a little less often (5.4%),
newly acquired players are a little younger (25.0 years), transfers are more often
international (50.5%), and the performance of the newly acquired players is a little
higher (3.208). Most notably, Panel B includes the transfer fee paid by the acquiring
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club to the releasing club.15 The average transfer fee is e2.46 million (inflation-
adjusted with year 2013 = 100). Note that there is substantial variation in paid
transfer fees as they range from e10,000 to e40 millions with a standard deviation of
e3.82 millions.
5.2 Model-free evidence
Before we turn to the estimation results of Eq. (1), we report the results of a model-free
analysis of our data. Specifically, we graphically compare the performance across the
groups of players acquired through tie-transfers and players acquired through market-
transfers (see Figure 1). We find that players acquired through tie-transfers have a
mean performance grade of 3.29, while players acquired through market-transfers have
a mean performance grade of 3.16, and that this difference of 3.9 percent is statistically
significant (t = 2.86, p < 0.01). This implies that players acquired through tie-
transfers outperform players acquired through market-transfers and provides initial,
suggestive evidence that tie-transfers can enhance the quality of transfer decisions.
5.3 Regression analysis
Table 3 shows regression estimates of the effect of tie-transfers on the performance
grade of newly acquired players. Model M1 incorporates control variables for the
tactical position of a player, the age of a player, coach tenure, the transfer type, as
well as a dummy for international transfers and club, coach, and season fixed-effects.
In Model M2, we introduce the transfer fee paid by the acquiring club to the releasing
15Transfer fees are based on data extracted and collected from www.transfermarkt.de. The data includes best estimates
where transfer fees are not disclosed by clubs. Whilst the estimates are not exact science, UEFA itself relies on
transfer fee data from www.transfermarkt.de in their Club Licensing Benchmarking Report, arguing that the data
is deemed suitably accurate for comparative purposes (UEFA, 2012, p. 48).
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Figure 1
Mean performance grade across the groups of players acquired through market-transfers and tie-transfers.
Notes: The figure depicts the mean performance grade of newly arrived players as a function of the transfer group
by which they were acquired. Market-transfer indicates the group of transfers (N = 2, 156) in which the coach and
the player have not worked together in the past. Tie-transfer indicates the group of transfers in which the coach and
the player have worked together in the past (N = 157). The difference across both groups of transfers is statistically
significant (t = 2.86, p < 0.01).
club as an additional control variable. As transfer fees are only paid in buy transfers,
Model M2 is estimated with a reduced sample of transfers. In Model M3 and M4, we
use the log-transformed performance-grade as a dependent variable in order to allow
for a non-linear effect from tie-transfers on the performance of newly acquired players.
The results from all models show that tie-transfers increase the performance grade
of newly acquired players. For the full sample, we find an absolute increase in per-
formance of 0.076 grading points (Model M1) and a relative increase in performance
of 2.5 percent (Model M3). For the buy transfer subsample, we find an absolute in-
crease in performance of 0.103 grading points (Model M2) and a relative increase in
performance of 3.3 percent (Model M4). We emphasize that the positive effect cannot
reflect selection of better clubs or coaches into the use of tie-transfers, because club
and coach fixed-effects serve as a control for their time-invariant “quality type”. More-
over, as we include the transfer fee as a control in Models M2 and M4, the positive
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Table 3
Effect of tie-transfers on the performance of newly acquired players.
Variables Performance-grade log(Performance-grade)
M1 M2 M3 M4
(all transfers) (buy transfers) (all transfers) (buy transfers)
Tie-transfer 0.076* 0.103* 0.025* 0.033*
(0.040) (0.056) (0.014) (0.018)
Defender –0.632*** –0.565*** –0.179*** –0.151***
(0.049) (0.085) (0.147) (0.026)
Midfielder –0.712*** –0.661*** –0.205*** –0.185***
(0.049) (0.085) (0.014) (0.0.26)
Striker –0.849*** –0.825*** –0.255*** –0.243***
(0.052) (0.089) (0.016) (0.028)
Age –0.056* –0.179*** –0.014 -0.059***
(0.031) (0.046) (0.011) (0.016)
Age2 0.001** 0.003*** 0.0003 0.001***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.014)
Coach tenure –0.030*** –0.029** –0.010*** –0.009**
(0.009) (0.012) (0.003) (0.004)
International transfer –0.053** –0.067** –0.021*** –0.025**
(0.021) (0.030) (0.007) (0.010)
Free-agent transfer –0.073*** – –0.025*** –
(0.023) (0.008)
Loan transfer –0.040 – –0.016 –
(0.036) (0.013)
Transfer fee (log) – 0.095*** – 0.034***
(0.018) (0.007)
Club fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Coach fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Season fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,313 1,197 2,313 1,197
Notes: OLS estimates for Eq. (1) are displayed. The dependent variable is the average grading over all matches
played by a newly acquired player in the season of his transfer (non-transformed in Models M1 and M2 and
log-transformed in Models M3 and M4). Models M1 and M3 include the full sample. Models M2 and M4 include the
reduced sample with only buy transfers. All estimations also included a constant (not reported). Robust standard
errors that have been adjusted for clustering at the individual player level are given in parentheses. *, **, and ***
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
performance effect cannot simply reflect the selection of players with a higher market
price in tie-transfers. Taken together, our findings indicate that, overall, previous
coach–player ties have a positive effect on the quality of transfer decisions.
To investigate whether the benefits of tie-transfers depend on the experience of
a coach with the current club and the time lag between tie and transfer, we show
regression estimates of the effects of the four tie-transfer subgroups in Table 4. The
results show that tie-transfers are only beneficial if the coach is well established at the
current club. For cases with an established coach and past ties, we observe that newly
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Table 4
Effect of decomposed tie-transfers on the performance of newly acquired players.
Variables Performance-grade log(Performance-grade)
S1 S2 S3 S4
(all transfers) (buy transfers) (all transfers) (buy transfers)
Subgroups of tie-transfers:
New coach/past tie 0.089 0.136 0.031 0.041
(0.059) (0.089) (0.020) (0.028)
New coach/recent tie –0.163* –0.255** –0.047 –0.077**
(0.089) (0.109) (0.031) (0.039)
Established coach/past tie 0.127** 0.235*** 0.039* 0.077***
(0.060) (0.079) (0.021) (0.024)
Established coach/recent tie 0.551** 0.438 0.165** 0.131
(0.269) (0.336) (0.079) (0.094)
Defender –0.632*** –0.557*** –0.179*** –0.149***
(0.049) (0.085) (0.015) (0.026)
Midfielder –0.714*** –0.654*** –0.206 –0.183***
(0.048) (0.085) (0.014) (0.026)
Striker –0.853*** –0.825*** –0.256*** –0.243***
(0.051) (0.089) (0.016) (0.028)
Age –0.057* –0.184*** –0.014 –0.061***
(0.031) (0.046) (0.011) (0.016)
Age2 0.001** 0.004*** 0.0003 0.001***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Coach tenure –0.032*** –0.032*** –0.010*** –0.010**
(0.009) (0.012) (0.003) (0.004)
International transfer –0.050** –0.065** –0.020*** –0.024**
(0.021) (0.030) (0.007) (0.010)
Free-agent transfer –0.072*** – –0.025*** –
(0.022) (0.008)
Loan transfer -0.041 – –0.017 –
(0.036) (0.013)
Transfer fee (log) – 0.095*** – 0.034***
(0.018) (0.007)
Club fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Coach fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Season fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,313 1,197 2,313 1,197
Notes: OLS estimates for Eq. (1) with a decomposed tie-transferpcs variable are displayed. The dependent variable
is the average grading over all seasonal matches of a newly acquired player (non-transformed in Models S1 and S2
and log-transformed in Models S3 and S4). Models S1 and S3 include the full sample. Models S2 and S4 include the
reduced sample with only buy transfers. The tie-transfer subgroups are defined as follows: if the seasonal lag between
the end of a previous coach–player working relationship and the transfer is no more than one season, the tie is recent;
else the tie is past. If the seasonal lag between the entry of a coach at the current club and the transfer is no more than
one season, the coach is new; else the coach is established. All estimations also included a constant (not reported).
Robust standard errors that have been adjusted for clustering at the individual player level are given in parentheses.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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acquired players outperform those acquired through market-transfers by 3.9 percent
in Model S3 (Model S4: 7.7%). For cases with an established coach and recent ties,
the outperformance is even higher at 16.5 percent in Model S3 (Model S4: 13.1%16).
In contrast, players acquired in tie-transfers involving new coaches do not outperform
those acquired in market-transfers, regardless of whether the ties are past or recent.
We find no evidence that benefits of tie-transfers occur only in the short-term
because tie-transfers with past ties and established coaches have a significant and
positive effect on the performance of newly acquired players. In fact, we find that the
least beneficial subgroup of tie-transfers is when ties are actually recent and coaches
are new: such newly acquired players perform even worse than newly acquired players
from market-transfers, even when we introduce the transfer fee as a control variable
(Model S2 and S4). Conditional on the transfer fee paid by a club, players acquired
through tie-transfers underperform players acquired through market-transfers by 7.7
percent. Note that this negative effect becomes as high as 14.3 percent if recent ties
and new coaches are defined using more conservative cut-off points to operationalize
the four tie-transfer subgroups (see Appendix, Table A.1)
6 Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, we provide empirical evidence on the effect of previous coach–player
ties on the quality of transfer decisions in professional soccer. The first finding of this
study is that coach–player ties have a major impact on the selection of players in the
transfer market. We observe that 6.8 percent of all transfers in the German Bundesliga
include a past working relationship between the coach and the newly acquired player.
16Note, that the outperformance of cases with an established coach and recent ties in Model S4 (13.1%) fails to achieve
statistical significance (p = 0.162) due to the increased standard errors of the estimates that reflect on the very small
number of observations in that case.
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Second, we show that such tie-transfers enhance the quality of transfer decisions, as
players acquired through tie-transfers outperform players acquired through market-
transfers by 3 percent. This indicates that coaches, overall, have the ability to screen
their player networks effectively in making referrals for transfer decisions.
Third, our findings indicate that tie-transfers are not equally effective in all situ-
ations. Players acquired through tie-transfers involving new coaches and recent ties
underperform players acquired though market-transfers by almost 8 percent. We
emphasize that we observe this negative effect despite the compelling theoretical rea-
soning that coaches have high incentives to make “good” referrals due to the strong
disciplinary power of the labor market for professional soccer coaches (D’Addona &
Kind, 2014; De Paola & Scoppa, 2012; Barros et al., 2009). To us, it is most likely
that coaches are subject to judgement biases in the context of new entry at a club and
recent ties with players. We suggest that new entry at a club may tempt coaches to
target familiar but suboptimal players in response to a familiarity bias. In addition,
a heightened sense of trust may lead to a more favorable interpretation of players
known from recently working together. As a consequence, new coaches could mistak-
enly make suboptimal referrals on players with which they have worked just before at
their prior clubs.17
Alternatively, one could try to explain the observed negative effect with network-
based incentives that distort coaches’ cost-benefit evaluation of transfer decisions (see
e.g., Beaman & Magruder, 2012; Bandiera et al., 2009; Brandes et al., 2015). For
example, Brandes et al. (2015) argue that managers in professional basketball select
suboptimal hirings in order to reduce disutility from search efforts and to derive pri-
vate utility from interactions with socially connected others. However, we believe
17Our explanation closely follows the idea of Ishii and Xuan (2014) who present a similar underlying mechanism for
lower value creation in mergers that include personal ties between firm directors.
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that this argumentation has low explanatory bite in our case. First, player recruit-
ing is not part of the main job responsibilities of professional soccer coaches and
any involvement in transfer decisions results in more and not less search activity for
coaches. Therefore, there is not much to reduce in search effort disutility by referring
(suboptimal) transfers. Second, the strong disciplinary power of the labor market for
coaches in professional soccer and the necessity to be successful on the pitch match
after match makes it very unlikely that coaches refer suboptimal transfers in response
to some sort of private utility.
The implications of our findings for professional soccer clubs are relatively straight-
forward. The presented results suggest that previous coach–player ties can be a valu-
able resource for clubs’ transfer market activities. Given the difficulty of observing and
evaluating the quality and fit of new players, coach–player ties represent an attractive
alternative to better find out the club-specific value of players. A recent illustrative
example of a successful tie-transfer is Borussia Moenchengladbach’s acquisition of the
Brazilian striker Raffael from Dynamo Kyiv (UA) in the summer 2013 (see Table A.2,
Nr. 54). The coach of Borussia Moenchengladbach, Lucien Favre, had previously
worked with Raffael at Hertha Berlin (2008–2009) and FC Zurich (CH) (2005–2007)
and the resulting fit of Raffael with Borussia Moenchengladbach was perfect: Raffael
was in the starting line-up in all 34 matches of the season, scored 14 goals and 8
assists and was evaluated (by the Kicker experts) as the fourth best striker in the
whole league in the season 2013/14.
At the same time, our results also urge clubs to be cautious when a newly hired
coach wants to bring players straight from his previous club, because such tie-transfers
result on average in poorer transfer decisions. An illustrative example for such a failure
tie-transfer is Schalke 04’s signing of the Dutch midfielder Orlando Engelaar from
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Twente Enschede (NL) in the summer 2008 for a transfer fee of e5.5 million (see Table
A.2, Nr. 125). The transfer was evidently initiated by coach Fred Rutten who moved
from Twente Enschede to Schalke in the summer 2008, having worked with Engelaar
at Twente Enschede from 2006–2008. However, Orlando Engelaar’s appointment at
Schalke became a disaster. The Kicker experts rated Orlando Engelaar as the worst
midfielder of the whole league in the season 2008/09 and he left Schalke after just one
year with the club.18
Of course, our ability to draw definitive conclusions about the effects of ties be-
tween coaches and players is limited by several research design considerations of this
study. The first limitation stems from the fact that we have data on the performance
of the newly acquired players only at the consolidated level of a season. Ideally, we
would have data on the level of the individual match that allowed us to investigate
intra-seasonal dynamics more precisely (e.g., to better distinguish between informa-
tional advantages and ease of transition).
A second limitation is that the admittedly small number of observations in the
decomposed subgroups of tie-transfers does not allow us to address within-subgroup
variation. Therefore, the application of extended analyses that investigate the sub-
group effects more precisely are not feasible. However, we think that especially the
underperformance of newly acquired players in the case of new coaches and recent
ties would be very interesting for further investigations of the underlying mechanism.
A third limitation relates to the that fact that our study focuses solely on newly ac-
quired players. While this focus eliminates concerns of unobserved differences between
newly acquired and on-going players, it does not allow investigations of the long-term
implications of tie-transfers. Future studies should conduct analyses on the longevity
18The somewhat amusing end of the story is that Orlando Engelaar was acquired by PSV Eindoven (NL) in summer
2009 and that Fred Rutten, after dismissal at Schalke in March 2009, was now the coach of PSV Eindhoven.
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of the effects of tie-transfers. For example, one could test whether the performance
effects persist in the following seasons and whether the length of stay differs between
players acquired through tie-transfers and players acquired through market-transfers.
Despite these limitations, we believe that our research makes important contri-
butions by providing new insights into the transfer market in professional soccer.
Using the idea that coaches have acquired valuable information on the players they
worked with at previous clubs, we demonstrate the benefits of coach referrals for clubs’
decision-making in the transfer market but also that not all coach referrals are equally
valuable. Depending how much experience a coach has with the current team and
the time lag between the previous coach–player relationship and the transfer of the
player, we observe positive effects, no significant effects, and sometimes even negative
effects of coach referrals on the performance of newly acquired players.
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Appendix
Table A.1
Effect of decomposed tie-transfers on the performance of newly acquired players: alternative measures.
Variables Performance-grade log(Performance-grade)
(1) (2) (3 ) (4)
(all transfers) (buy transfers) (all transfers) (buy transfers)
Panel A: using a time period of 12 months to distinguish between new/established coaches and recent/past ties
Subgroups of tie-transfers:
New coach/past tie 0.076 0.143 0.026 0.044
(0.059) (0.091) (0.019) (0.029)
New coach/recent tie –0.169* –0.256** –0.050 –0.077**
(0.092) (0.109) (0.032) (0.039)
Established coach/past tie 0.128** 0.200** 0.040** 0.065***
(0.058) (0.079) (0.020) (0.025)
Established coach/recent tie 0.590** 0.807*** 0.178** 0.236***
(0.250) (0.294) (0.073) (0.077)
Panel B: using a time period of 6 months to distinguish between new/established coaches and recent/past ties
Subgroups of tie-transfers:
New coach/past tie 0.093 0.137 0.035 0.045
(0.073) (0.098) (0.023) (0.031)
New coach/recent tie –0.239** –0.444*** –0.076* –0.143***
(0.122) (0.127) (0.044) (0.047)
Established coach/past tie 0.114** 0.201*** 0.036** 0.065***
(0.048) (0.065) (0.016) (0.021)
Established coach/recent tiea n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Club fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Coach fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Season fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,313 1,197 2,313 1,197
Notes: OLS estimates for Eq. (1) with a decomposed tie-transferpcs variable are displayed. In Panel A, a cutoff date
of 12 months before the transfer is used to distinguish new/established coaches and recent/past ties. In Panel B, a
cutoff date of 6 months before the transfer is used to distinguish new/established coaches and recent/past ties. All
estimations also included a constant (not reported). Robust standard errors that have been adjusted for clustering at
the individual player level are given in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively.
aTie-transfers involving an established coach and a recent tie do not occur if using a time period of 6 months to
distinguish between new/established coaches and recent/past ties. This is because established coaches are with the
current team for more than 6 months and recent ties indicate that a coach must have worked with a player within the
last 6 months. As players are allowed to move only every 6 months (i.e., in the subsequent transfer window), it is not
possible for a transfer to fulfill both requirements at the same time.
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A.3
Does sports activity improve health?
Representative evidence using proximity to
sports facilities as an instrument∗
Abstract
Using representative and geocoded data from the Swiss Household Panel
and the Swiss Business Census, we estimate the effect of sports activity on
health care utilization and health. Because sports activity is likely correlated
with unobserved determinants of health care utilization and health, we use the
number of sports facilities within 6 miles of the individual’s residence as an
instrument. We find that doing sports at least once a week significantly reduces
the number of doctor visits, overweight and sleeping problems. The magnitudes
of these effects are larger in the IV estimations than in OLS estimations, which
are biased toward zero due to reporting errors in sports activity and an omitted
variable bias. To know the magnitudes of the causal effects is crucial for any
kind of cost-benefit analysis of promoting individual sports activity.
JEL Classification: I10; I12; H51; C26
Keywords: sports activity; health care utilization; health; instrumental variable;
proximity to sports facilities
∗This paper has been written jointly with Stephan Nüesch and Egon Franck.
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1 Introduction
Physical inactivity is widely acknowledged as a global health problem in the 21st
century. The proportion of inactive people is rising in many countries, creating risks
for individual health, health care utilization and ultimately public health care costs
(World Health Organization, 2010). Therefore, exercise and intervention programs
that target an increase of individual physical activity are a recurring theme on the
agenda of policy makers around the world (Heath et al., 2012). Such programs are
supported by a rich body of cross-sectional epidemiological research showing a posi-
tive correlation between physical inactivity and a wide variety of detrimental health
outcomes such as obesity, hypertension, osteoporosis, osteoarthritis, diabetes melli-
tus, colon and breast cancer, depression (see e.g., Warburton, Nicol, & Bredin, 2006;
Katzmarzyk & Janssen, 2004) and health care utilization such as doctor consultations
and hospital days (see e.g., Manning, Keeler, Newhouse, Sloss, & Wasserman, 1991;
Haapanen-Niemi, Miilunpalo, Vuori, Pasanen, & Oja, 1999; Katzmarzyk, Gledhill, &
Shephard, 2000; Sari, 2009).
However, because physical activity is an endogenous choice variable and therefore
likely correlated with unobservable confounders, evidence from correlational studies
cannot be given a causal interpretation. For example, health-conscious people with a
high level of body awareness may be more active. At the same time, such people also
tend to get more health screenings (e.g., cancer screening or general health checks)
and tend to visit the doctor more often (Ioannou, Chapko, & Dominitz, 2003; Hansell,
Sherman, & Mechanic, 1991). Another potential confounder is a person’s healthy or
unhealthy lifestyle, for example her nutrition, sleeping behaviour or personal hygiene.
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A healthy lifestyle tends to be positively correlated with sports activity and negatively
correlated with health issues and health care utilization.
Randomized control trials can potentially solve the endogeneity issue by assigning
individuals to treatment groups with an intervention program or to control groups.
Field experiments on physical activity and health-related outcomes have been con-
ducted with Texaco employees (Baun, Bemacki, & Tsai, 1986), employees of insurance
companies (Shephard, 1992), Bank of America retirees (Leigh et al., 1992), or John-
son and Johnson employees (Ozminkowski et al., 2002). But because samples in these
studies are small and derived from very specific settings, results from these experi-
mental studies are hardly generalizable to the rest of the population (Sari, 2009).
In this study, we take advantage of two hitherto uncombined data sets from
Switzerland to address both the endogeneity and the external reliability issues. We
combine representative survey data on individual sports activity and health-related
outcomes with data on sports infrastructure. Employing geographic coordinates of in-
dividual home addresses and units of sports facilities, we use the availability of sports
facilities to predict sports activity. Geographic proximity to sports facilities is an ideal
instrument because it increases sports activity, and the supply of sports facilities is
exogenous to unobservable factors affecting health and health care utilization (at the
individual level).
Our identification strategy is related to the work of Huang and Humphreys (2012),
who use proximity to sports facilities to identify the effect of sports activity on hap-
piness, and Bowblis and McHone (2013) and Grabowski, Feng, Hirth, Rahman, and
Mor (2013), who use proximity to nursing homes with different ownership to test the
influence of nursing ownership on care quality. We are the first to use geographic
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proximity to sports facilities as an instrument in the context of sports activity and
health.
We find that doing sports at least once a week reduces the number of doctor
visits and the number of hospital days. The magnitudes of these effects are larger in
our estimations using instrumental variable (IV) models than in those using non-IV
models and in related correlational studies (Sari, 2009; Haapanen-Niemi et al., 1999;
Keeler, Manning, Newhouse, Sloss, & Wasserman, 1989). When we use proximity
to sports facilities as an instrument for sports activity, individuals who do sports at
least once a week have 23 percent of the doctor visits and 43 percent of the number
of hospital days of inactive individuals (although the latter effect is not statistically
significant due to the high standard errors in the IV model).
Because self-reported sports activity information likely suffers from misreporting
(Ferrari, Friedenreich, & Matthews, 2007), we argue that non-IV estimates on the
effect of sports activity on health care utilization are biased towards zero. IV models
provide a solution to the errors-in-variables problem and the resulting attenuation
bias. In addition, the non-IV models may also underestimate the effects of sports
activity on health care utilization due to a positive omitted variable bias. For example,
individuals who do sports at least once a week may be more health-conscious than
non-active individuals, and (unobserved) health-consciousness increases health care
utilization, holding everything else equal (Ioannou et al., 2003; Hansell et al., 1991).
In order to examine the channels through which sports activity influences health
care utilization, we estimate how sports activity affects four specific health outcomes:
overweight, sleeping problems, headaches, and back problems. Our IV results confirm
findings from previous correlational studies showing that sports activity significantly
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reduces overweight (Janssen et al., 2005; Ortega, Ruiz, & Sjöström, 2007; Patrick et
al., 2004) and sleeping problems (Atkinson & Davenne, 2007).
While the effects of sports activity on headaches and back problems are also nega-
tive and significant in the non-IV models, they become statistically insignificant when
instrumenting sports activity by proximity to sports facilities. This indicates a reverse
causation issue in the non-IV models. Using the proximity to sports facilities as an
instrument of sports activity addresses the reverse causation issue as headaches and
back problems decrease the propensity to do sports. Notably, the insignificant effect
of sports activity on back problems is in line with comprehensive evidence from a
recent medical review study (Sitthipornvorakul, Janwantanakul, Purepong, Pensri, &
van der Beek, 2011).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we outline our
data and the empirical strategy. In Section 3, we explain our estimation method. In
Section 4, we present the results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Data and empirical strategy
The empirical problems of disentangling the relationship between individual sports
activity and health-related outcomes are manifest. On the one hand, if one relies
on observable field data from representative samples, self-selection is a major issue
because sports activity is an endogenous choice variable. Failure to account for this
source of endogeneity will bias any estimation of an effect from individual sports activ-
ity (see e.g., Heckman, 1979). On the other hand, if one relies on quasi-experimental
clinical trials that allow for randomization of fitness program participants and control
groups, findings are hardly representative for general populations (Sari, 2009).
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To consider both issues at once, we use representative field data on individual
sports activity and health-related outcomes and address the self-selection problem
by employing an instrumental variables strategy. We use variation in geographic
proximity to sports facilities as an instrument for individual sports activity. The
reasoning behind this strategy is that living close to sports facilities implies easier
access to sports infrastructure (Huang & Humphreys, 2012) and reduces the “costs”
of doing sports. Both monetary costs (in terms of transportation costs) and time costs
(for travelling) indicate a positive relation between short distances to sports facilities
and sports activity (see also the discussion in Felfe, Lechner, and Steinmayr (2011))
In this section, we first describe our data sources. Second, we discuss the dependent
and independent variables that we investigate in our analysis and third, we present
and discuss our instrumental variable.
2.1 Description of data sources
The data on sports activity, health and health care utilization is part of the tenth
wave of the Swiss Household Panel (SHP) collected in 2008. A key advantage of SHP
is that the sample includes a stratified random sample of households representing the
resident population of Switzerland. Originally, the randomization of the sample was
constructed under guidance of the Swiss Federal Statistical Office based on the major
statistical regions in Switzerland (for detailed information about the sample design,
see Voorpostel et al., 2012). Overall, our sample comprises 6,872 individuals (aged 14
years and older) living in 4,166 distinct households. The data for these 6,872 individ-
uals were collected using computer-assisted telephone interviews held from September
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2008 to February 2009. The survey includes questions on individual sports activity,
health and health care utilization, and other socioeconomic characteristics.1
To measure the availability of sport facilities for the individuals in the SHP sample,
we obtained additional data from the Swiss Business Census for the year 2008. The
Business Census is a mandatory survey of workplaces and businesses in Switzerland
and aims to collect full data on their economic activity, the number of persons em-
ployed, and their exact geographic location.2 The data is collected by means of paper
questionnaires and online questionnaires under the responsibility of the Swiss Federal
Statistical Office. The reference day for the 2008 Business Census was September 30,
2008.
A specific classification code of economic activity (called NOGA codes in the Swiss
context) marks sport facilities. Under NOGA code 931100, facilities for indoor or out-
door sports are recorded. This includes football grounds, athletics grounds, swimming
pools, golf courses and so on. In total, about one thousand sport facilities are recorded
by NOGA code 931100. An important advantage is the geo-coding of each sports fa-
cility via Swiss grid coordinates. These coordinates pinpoint the location of a sports
facility within a few meters of the building’s midpoint and allow us to draw a very
precise map of the geographic distribution of sports facilities in Switzerland.
In the standard version of SHP, the most accurate geographic information on an
individual’s home location is the canton of residence. However, to obtain an accurate
link between SHP individuals and sports facilities, we needed more detailed geographic
information. We gratefully acknowledge SHP’s provision of exact home addresses for
1After dropping a small number of individuals that did not respond correctly to all of the items of our analysis, the
final sample consists of 6,558 out of the original 6,872 individuals included in the SHP survey.
2Participation in the survey is compulsory for all targeted workplaces and businesses. However, there is a minimum
of 20 hours of weekly work for a business unit to be targeted by the survey. Therefore, the data does not include
very small sports facilities that do not employ at least one person with an engagement of 50 percent or more.
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each individual in the data set, after we signed a special confidentiality agreement.
The provided home addresses included information on the community, zip code, street
name and street number.3 We used the public webpage http://tools.retorte.ch/map/
to transform this address data into Swiss grid coordinates. Using the home address
Swiss grid coordinates, we are able to pinpoint linear distances between the residence
of an individual and all sports facilities obtained from the Swiss Business Census with
a precision of a few meters.
2.2 Health and health care utilization measures
The SHP survey includes two items on health care utilization. In a question on doctor
visits, respondents were asked: “In the last 12 months, how many times have you
consulted a doctor?” Doctor visits at home are explicitly included in these numbers
(through the interviewers’ introduction of the question), whereas visits to a dentist do
not count. In a similar question on hospital services, respondents were asked: “In the
last 12 months, how many days have you spent in a hospital or specialized clinic, not
including spas or wellness cures?” Outcomes for both items are non-negative, integer
count variables.
To examine the potential channels through which sports activity affects health care
utilization, we also aim to test the effect of sports activity on various health outcomes.
Following the questions included in the SHP survey, we consider four specific indicators
for health problems. Most notably, we include a discrete indicator for overweight,
which has been argued to be both a consequence of physical inactivity due to a
disrupted energy balance (Katzmarzyk & Janssen, 2004) and a risk factor for chronic
3SHP was not able to provide the complete address for 43 individuals (either no street name was provided or the
provided street name was not identifiable). In these cases, we were not able to obtain Swiss grid coordinates. Hence,
we were not able to match these individuals with the sports infrastructure data and were forced to exclude them
from our sample.
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health problems (Dixon, 2010) and health care utilization (Cawley & Meyerhoefer,
2012). To identify overweight individuals, we converted height and weight data into a
discrete measure of overweight via WHO Body Mass Index guidelines (World Health
Organization, 2000).
Other specific indicators available from the SHP survey include regular suffering
from sleeping problems, headaches, and back problems. They were obtained from
questions of the type: “During the last 4 weeks, have you suffered from one of the
following disorders or health problems?” While respondents were allowed to choose
between three categories (not at all, somewhat, very much), we used a binary yes/no
coding that only treats serious incidences (i.e., very much) as a specific health problem.
2.3 Sports activity measure
To identify individual sports activity, we draw on an SHP question from the leisure
time section. Respondents were asked: “How frequently do you practice an individual
or team sport (for example fitness, jogging, football, volley ball, tennis)?” Respon-
dents were free to provide any description of their sports activity level but interviewers
were supposed to help respondents provide a reasonable answer if necessary. After-
wards, interviewers had to assign the responses to five different levels of sports activity:
every day, at least once a week, at least once a month, less then once a month, never.
Large proportions of the respondents reported doing sports activities at least once
a week (57.9%) or not at all (25.6%). Each of the other three categories contained
only a small proportion of the respondents: 6.9 percent reported daily sports activity,
and 9.5 percent reported some occasional sports activity but not every week (at least
once a month: 7.1%; less than once a month: 2.4%). To allow for a straighforward
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interpretation of the results, we aggregate the five categories of sports activity into
the discrete measure of sports activity “at least once a week”.4
2.4 Instrumental variable: proximity to sports facilities
To mimic randomization of individuals’ selection into sports activity, we use geo-
graphic proximity to sports facilities as an instrument. We define proximity to sports
facilities as the number of sports facilities within a certain radius surrounding an indi-
vidual’s home address. The key issue in the construction of the measure is to identify
an appropriate radius up to which sports facilities potentially affect a person’s sports
activity.
Table 1 shows summary statistics for different distance boundaries (1 mile to
10 miles) and the F-statistics for the measures in first-stage regressions. The F-
test of instrument exclusion is significant for all radii and is above the threshold-
level of 10 (Staiger & Stock, 1997) for radii between 3 and 10 miles. Due to the
highest explanatory power in the first-stage regression, we use the number of sports
facilities within 6 miles as instrument in the main specification. The use of 6 miles
as distance boundary is also consistent with an empirical finding by Pawlowski et al.
(2009) that people are on average willing to spend a maximum of 28 minutes to travel
to sport facilities. However, our results are widely robust to the use of alternative
distance boundaries to construct the instrument (see Table A.2 in the Appendix).5
4The dichotomization avoids any functional form assumptions for different subgroup effects (Lechner, 2009). Of course,
one could easily argue for counting occasional sports activity as being active. For example, Lechner (2009) has chosen
a definition that separates less then monthly sports participation (inactive) and monthly sports participation (active).
To test for the impact of our particular definition, we additionally estimated all our models with cut-off points that
treat occasional sports participation as “active”. The results are virtually unaffected by the alternative cut-off points
(see Appendix, Table A.1).
5The only findings that do not hold for all boundaries between 4 and 8 miles are related to the effect of sports activity
on sleeping problems and overweight. While the coefficients remain negative throughout all specifications, the effects
become marginally insignificant for the 4-mile boundary for overweight and the for 7- and 8-mile boundaries for
sleeping problems. This indicates that reduced power in the first stage significantly affects the precision in the second
stage.
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Table 1
Comparison of different measures of proximity to sports facilities.
First-stage F-test
Distance boundaries Mean Std.dev. of excluded instrument
Sports facilities within 1 mile 1.68 2.30 F=2.71
Sports facilities within 2 miles 5.01 6.41 F=8.19
Sports facilities within 3 miles 9.13 10.88 F=19.15
Sports facilities within 4 miles 13.70 15.43 F=24.48
Sports facilities within 5 miles 18.45 19.56 F=30.68
Sports facilities within 6 miles 23.41 23.44 F=33.71
Sports facilities within 7 miles 28.67 27.66 F=27.51
Sports facilities within 8 miles 34.37 31.97 F=30.26
Sports facilities within 9 miles 40.52 36.39 F=29.02
Sports facilities within 10 miles 47.14 40.78 F=21.66
Number of households 4,016
Number of individuals 6,558
Notes: Data on sports facilities is drawn from the 2008 Swiss Business Census and is linked to the home addresses of
SHP individuals. The F-test of excluded instrument reflects the power of our measure of proximity to sports facilities
in Eq. (1) presented in Section 3. All models control for age, gender, marital status, education, household income,
household with children, community typology, and population density.
An illustrative example of our approach is shown in Figure 1 for an individual living
in central Switzerland.
Of course, valid instruments not only have to be powerful. The exogeneity condi-
tion of IV regressions requires that instruments are not correlated with the error term
in the second stage (see e.g., Stock & Watson, 2003; Murray, 2006). In our analysis,
this means that proximity to sports facilities must be uncorrelated with health-related
outcomes, except through variables that are included in the equation. Hence, we have
to diligently check the control variables. More specifically, we have to control for
factors that correlate with both proximity to sports facilities and health/health care
utilization. Brunekreef and Holgate (2002), Passchier-Vermeer and Passchier (2000)
and Boes, Nüesch, and Stillman (2013) show that living in urban areas is likely to
affect individual health status through noise pollution, air pollution and other fac-
tors. At the same time, urban areas with a high population density naturally provide
a higher number of sports facilities. Therefore, we include two measures of residen-
tial area characteristics for each individual home address in our analysis. These are
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Figure 1
Measure of proximity to sport facilities.
Notes: The figure depicts a distance boundary of 6 miles for counting the number of sports facilities surrounding an
individual’s home address. Filled squares represent units that are included in the count measure (i.e., 21) and empty
squares represent units that are treated as “out of reach”.
the community typology (following the official SHP categorization) and population
density6 per square mile.
In addition, we include a large set of demographic and socio-economic control
variables that may reflect individual differences in the availability of sports facilities
and that have been widely used in studies on residential choice and in studies on
health-related outcomes (see e.g., Winkelmann, 2004; Sari, 2009; Lee &Waddell, 2010;
6The data on home-address specific population density is obtained from the 1990, 2000, and 2010 Swiss Population
Census through extrapolation for the year 2008. The Population Census counts all individuals in each and every
hectare in Switzerland. We linked this hectare-based population data to the SHP households via Swiss grid coor-
dinates. Population size is converted into population density per square mile based on the same distance boundary
that is used for our proximity to sports facility measure (i.e., 6 miles in the main specification).
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Kim, Pagliara, & Preston, 2005). These include age, sex, marital status, education,
household earnings7, and household with children.
Nevertheless, one must always be cautious with regard to the exogeneity condition
of IV models because it is impossible to prove the null hypothesis of no correlation
between instruments and the (unobserved) error term in the second stage. If more
sporty people intentionally choose to live close to sports facilities, our IV estimates
could still be biased (irrespective of our included controls). However, research on
residential choice suggests that non-work travel preferences do not play an important
role in neighbourhood selection and that considerations of accessibility are mainly
driven by commuting to work (see the discussion in Chatman (2009)). For example,
Lee, Waddell, Wang, and Pendyala (2010) estimated that commuting to work is more
than ten times as important as the shopping opportunities in the neighbourhood for
residential choice. Following this view, we believe that unobserved residential sorting
based on proximity to sports facilities is not a major concern for our estimation
strategy.
3 Estimation method
Because previous research has shown that non-linear IV models are potentially biased
when estimated with standard two-stage least squares methods (see the discussion in
Terza, Bradford, & Dismuke, 2008), we estimate a two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI)
model. 2SRI is basically a version of the control function approach developed by
Wooldridge (2002, 2014). Rather than replacing the endogenous explanatory variable
7Unfortunately, 7.9 percent of the individuals did not provide valid data for household earnings. In order to keep these
observations in the sample, we classify respondents into five different income groups, one of which is “unknown”.
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with the first-stage predictors, the equation in the second stage includes the first-stage
residuals as an additional regressor.
In the first stage of our 2SRI procedure, we identify the probability of an individual
to participate in sports activities by the following model framework:
sports-activityi = f(proximityi, Xi, ωi), (1)
where i indexes the individual and ω denotes the random regression error term. The
dependent variable sports-activityi is a dummy variable that is 1 for individuals that
participate in sports activities at least once a week and 0 for individuals that do
not. The variable proximityi captures the number of sports facilities within 6 miles
of the home address of individual i. The vector of covariates Xi captures a set of
home address-specific residential area controls and observed individual background
variables. The function f(·) will be a linear function in our main specification. Es-
timating the first stage by a linear probability model is the safest way when the
underlying error distribution is unknown (Angrist, 2001) and allows us to compute
the F-statistic of the excluded instrument.8
In the second stage, we model our outcome variables as a function of the endoge-
nous dummy for weekly sports activity, the set of covariates, and the saved residuals
of the regression in the first stage. The model framework is:
Hi = f(sports-activityi, Xi, ωˆi, νi), (2)
8As a sensitive check, our 2SRI estimation was repeated using a Probit model in the first stage. The results, presented
in Table A.3 of the Appendix, are widely unaffected by the use of a Probit specification. The only finding that does
not hold for a Probit first stage is related to the effect of sports activity on overweight. While the coefficient remains
strongly negative, the effect becomes marginally insignificant.
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where i again indexes the individual and νi denotes the random regression error
term. Xi denotes the vector of covariates from the first stage. The dependent variable
Hi represents our set of health-related outcomes variables. The main explanatory
variable of interest is sports-activityi. ωˆi denotes the residuals from the first-stage
estimation and substitutes for any unobserved confounders that might be correlated
with both sports-activityi and Hi.
For all binary outcome variables, we estimate the second stage using a a linear
probability model.9 For count outcome variables, we use negative binomial MLE.10
To account for the fact that the second stage of our 2SRI model includes a regressor
imputed from first-stage estimates, the coefficients’ standard errors in the second stage
are bootstrapped (Carpio, Wohlgenant, & Boonsaeng, 2008; Huang & Humphreys,
2012). A total of B = 999 replications were used to generate the standard errors,
confidence intervals and hypothesis tests.11
4 Results
4.1 Summary statistics
Descriptive statistics for all our variables are shown in Table 2. Individuals reported on
average 3.5 doctor visits and 0.9 hospital days within the 12-month period. There is a
very long right tail of the response distribution for both measures but the proportion
of reported zeros (indicating no use at all) is significantly higher for hospital use
9Additionally, we report Probit estimations for our binary outcome variables in the Appendix (see column (3) in Table
A.3). The results are widely unaffected by the alternative specification of the second stage.
10We choose the negative binomial MLE over Poisson estimation because the number of doctor visits and the number
of days in hospital are both overdispersed (Wooldridge, 2002).
11Since results using bootstrapped standard errors are not fully replicable by other researchers, we also estimated all
our models with conventional (Huber-White) “robust” standard errors. We obtained very similar standard errors
in both approaches, which resulted in identical inference for all outcome measures. Full results for estimations with
conventional standard errors are available from the authors upon request.
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than doctor use (85.3% compared to 24.9%).12 The high share of hospital non-users
also explains the low number of average hospital treatment days. 35.7 percent of
the individuals are overweight while about 8 to 10 percent of the individuals report
suffering from one of the other three health issues (sleeping problems, headaches, and
back problems).
65.3 percent of the individuals in our sample do sports at least once a week. Com-
pared to existing studies using samples from other countries, the proportion of active
people in our sample is in the middle of the range of the observed numbers. While
Huang and Humphreys (2012) found 76.5 percent of the individuals in a US sample
to be physically active, other studies from Canada and Germany found only about 50
percent (Sari, 2009; Humphreys, McLeod, & Ruseski, 2014) or 40 percent (Lechner,
2009; Sari, 2014) to be active individuals. Our instrument (Number of sports facili-
ties within 6 miles) has a mean value of 23.42. This indicates that individuals in our
sample have on average 23.4 sports facilities within 6 miles of their place of residence.
The measure has substantial variation as the number of sports facilities ranges from
zero to 106 with a standard deviation of 23.40.
The average age in the sample is 46.2 years. A little under half the sample is male
(44.4%) and a little over half the sample is married (53.8%). Individual education
splits into five categories with shares between 10 percent and 36 percent. The high
share of apprenticeships (36.4%) reflects the importance of occupational training in the
Swiss education system. In terms of household income, individuals are divided into
four income levels and a non-response group, with most individuals (32.6%) living
in households with an income between 50,000 and 100,000 Swiss Francs (reflecting
12To avoid problems with outliers (some individuals reported up to 200 doctor visits or 327 hospital days), we
“winsorized” the responses by setting outlying values to the 99th percentile. However, all our results are very
robust to use of the original (non-winsorized) reported values. We only observe a slight increase in the size of the
marginal effects using the original counts.
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roughly $48,000 - $96,000 based on the currency rate of 2008). Most of the individuals
live in urban centres (26.8%) or in a suburban type of community (30.5%). The
average population density per square mile is 1,575.4.
Table 2
Summary statistics.
Variables Mean Std.dev. Min. Max.
Health care utilization:
Number of doctor visits 3.485 5.121 0 30
Number of hospital days 0.876 3.347 0 25
Health:
Overweight 0.357 0.479 0 1
Sleeping problems 0.085 0.279 0 1
Headaches 0.077 0.266 0 1
Back problems 0.100 0.300 0 1
Individual sports activity:
Doing sports at least once a week 0.653 0.476 0 1
Instrumental variable:
Number of sports facilities within 6 miles 23.415 23.440 0 106
Demographics and socio-economic controls:
Age 46.12 18.36 14 96
Male 0.445 0.497 0 1
Married 0.537 0.499 0 1
Education: Compulsory 0.228 0.420 0 1
Education: Apprenticeship 0.363 0.481 0 1
Education: University-entrance diploma 0.100 0.299 0 1
Education: Post-apprenticeship diploma 0.161 0.368 0 1
Education: University degree 0.148 0.355 0 1
Household income: <50,001 Swiss Francs 0.111 0.314 0 1
Household income: 50,001–100,000 Swiss Francs 0.325 0.469 0 1
Household income: 100,001–150,000 Swiss Francs 0.280 0.449 0 1
Household income: >150,000 Swiss Francs 0.206 0.405 0 1
Household income: unknown 0.078 0.268 0 1
Household with children 0.372 0.483 0 1
Residential area:
Community typology: Centres 0.269 0.444 0 1
Community typology: Suburban 0.306 0.461 0 1
Community typology: Wealthy 0.038 0.191 0 1
Community typology: Periurban 0.114 0.318 0 1
Community typology: Touristic 0.023 0.149 0 1
Community typology: Industrial 0.088 0.284 0 1
Community typology: Rural 0.079 0.270 0 1
Community typology: Agricultural 0.084 0.277 0 1
Population density per square mile 1,575.0 1,370.2 9 5,737
Number of households 4,016
Number of individuals 6,558
Notes: Data on sports facilities is drawn from the 2008 Swiss Business Census. Data on population density is
interpolated from the 1990, 2000, and 2010 Swiss Population Census. All other variables are directly drawn from the
2008 SHP survey. Number of doctor visits and Number of hospital days are “winsorized” to the 99th percentile.
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4.2 First-stage results
The first-stage results show that the number of sports facilities within 6 miles signif-
icantly increases weekly sports activity (see Table 3). The F-statistic for excluding
the number of sports facilities in the regression is 33.71, indicating that our instru-
ment easily passes the conventional test for power in the first stage (Staiger & Stock,
1997). This implies that proximity to sports facilities strongly predicts individual
sports activity.
The estimates for the additional demographic and socio-economic controls are
largely consistent with previous research on the determinants of individual sports ac-
tivity (see e.g., Huang & Humphreys, 2012; Farrell & Shields, 2002). The likelihood
of sports activity strongly increases with education and household income and de-
creases with age. Interestingly, we observe males to be less active then women in the
Swiss context, while an earlier study from England showed the opposite relationship
between gender and sports activity (Farrell & Shields, 2002). With regard to the res-
idential area, we find that sports activity is higher in suburban areas than in centres
and that sports activity decreases with a higher population density.
4.3 Regression results
Table 4 presents the estimates of the effect of weekly sports activity on health care
utilization (Panel A) and health (Panel B). To consider the endogeneity of sports
activity, we estimate IV models using 2SRI. These models include the control variables
from the first-stage regression and the first-stage residuals as an additional regressor.
For the purpose of comparison, Table 4 also presents non-IV models that exclude the
first-stage residuals. Column (1) reports the estimated coefficients of weekly sports
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Table 3
First-stage results: probability of an individual to do sports at least once a week.
Variables LPM
M1
Number of sports facilities within 6 miles 0.006***
(0.001)
Age –0.004***
(0.0004)
Male –0.025**
(0.012)
Married –0.009
(0.015)
Education: Compulsory Ref. group
Education: Apprenticeship 0.030*
(0.016)
Education: University-entrance diploma 0.036*
(0.022)
Education: Post-apprenticeship diploma 0.080***
(0.020)
Education: University degree 0.108***
(0.020)
Household income: <50,001 Swiss Francs Ref. group
Household income: 50,001–100,000 Swiss Francs 0.084***
(0.022)
Household income: 100,001–150,000 Swiss Francs 0.153***
(0.024)
Household income: >150,000 Swiss Francs 0.197***
(0.025)
Household income: unknown 0.135***
(0.029)
Household with children –0.009
(0.014)
Community typology: Centres Ref. group
Community typology: Suburban 0.043***
(0.015)
Community typology: Wealthy 0.080***
(0.030)
Community typology: Periurban 0.057***
(0.020)
Community typology: Touristic –0.020
(0.042)
Community typology: Industrial –0.022
(0.024)
Community typology: Rural 0.017
(0.025)
Community typology: Agricultural 0.017
(0.024)
Population density per square mile/100 –0.010***
(0.002)
Observations 6,558
F-test of excluded instrument 33.71
Notes: In Model M1, OLS estimates for Eq. (1) are displayed. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that
takes a value of 1 for individuals that do sports at least once a week and a value of 0 otherwise. All estimations also
included a constant (not reported). Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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activity from the non-IV models and column (2) reports the estimated coefficients of
weekly sports activity using the 2SRI approach.
Because raw coefficient estimates from negative binomials are difficult to interpret
(Dávalos, Fang, & French, 2012), we also report the incidence rate ratio (IRR) for
models with count outcomes (i.e., the health care utilization models in Panel A).
An IRR represents the difference in the rate of the count outcome predicted by the
model when switching sports activity from zero to one while all other variables are
kept constant at their means. A value greater than one indicates that sports activity
increases the outcome, and a value between zero and one indicates that sports activity
decreases the outcome. The further away from one a value is, the stronger the effect
becomes.
The results from the non-IV models show that sports activity significantly reduces
the number of doctor visits, the number of hospital days, overweight, sleeping prob-
lems, headaches, and back problems (see column (1)). Controlling for the endogeneity
of sports activity with the 2SRI approach results in different findings. Column (2),
Panel A also shows that sports activity significantly reduces the number of doctor
visits but the magnitude of the effect is much larger when controlling for the endo-
geneity of sports activity. We observe an IRR of 23 percent in the IV model compared
to an IRR of 88 percent in the non-IV model. The greater distance of the IRR from
one in the IV model indicates a bias toward zero in the non-IV results. Similarly, we
find that sports activity reduces the number of hospital days at a higher rate when
using an IV model than when using a non-IV model (IRR of 43% compared to an IRR
of 73%). However, the effect of sports activity on hospital days is not statistically
significant in the IV model due to the high standard errors.
105
Table 4
Regression results: effects of weekly sports activity on health care utilization and health.
Non-IV IV (2SRI)
(1) (2)
Panel A: health care utilization outcomes (Negbin)
Number of doctor visits –0.132*** [0.876] –1.475*** [0.229]
(0.039) (0.531)
Number of hospital days –0.317*** [0.728] –0.840 [0.432]
(0.098) (1.438)
Panel B: health outcomes (LPM)
Overweight –0.102*** –0.280*
(0.012) (0.165)
Sleeping problems –0.031*** –0.230**
(0.008) (0.104)
Headaches –0.023*** 0.045
(0.007) (0.100)
Back problems –0.045*** 0.097
(0.008) (0.117)
Observations 6,558 6,558
F-test of excluded instrument in the first stage – 33.71
Notes: Non-IV estimates for weekly sports activity are displayed in column (1) with white robust standard errors in
parentheses. IV estimates for weekly sports activity are displayed in column (2) with bootstrapped standard errors
(999 reps) in parentheses. In Panel A, negative binomial MLE is used and incidence rate ratios are displayed in
brackets. In Panel B, OLS estimates are displayed. All models control for age, gender, marital status, education,
household income, household with children, community typology, and population density. All estimations also
included a constant (not reported). *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
Column (2), Panel B shows that sports activity significantly reduces the probabil-
ity of suffering from overweight and sleeping problems, by 28 percent and 23 percent,
respectively. Again, the magnitudes of the effects are larger when controlling for the
endogeneity of sports activity, indicating a bias toward zero in the non-IV results.
In contrast, the effects of sports activity on headaches and back problems become
statistically insignificant (and positive) in the IV models. Thus the findings from
the non-IV models seem to be spurious, because the effects from sports activity on
headaches and back problems disappear once the endogeneity of sports activity is
controlled for.
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5 Discussion and conclusion
This paper uses a representative sample of the Swiss population and geocoded data
on sports facilities, sports activity, health and health care utilization to estimate the
causal effect of sports activity on health and health care utilization. Unlike previous
correlational studies, we use an instrument for sports activity, namely the number
of sports facilities within 6 miles of the individual’s place of residence. We find that
sports activity significantly reduces doctor visits, overweight and sleeping problems.
Though the same trends are seen when we use an estimation without the instrumental
variable and have been seen in previous correlational studies, the magnitudes of these
effects are considerably larger in our IV estimations. Our results may be useful for
estimating the cost-effectiveness of sports facilities to encourage sports activity as a
way of reducing health problems and health care utilization.
Two reasons may explain why our IV estimates on health care utilization, over-
weight and sleeping problems are higher than the effects reported in the previous lit-
erature: first, our IV method addresses measurement error in the self-reported sports
activity variable (see Ferrari et al. (2007) for reporting errors of physical activity).
Reporting errors in sports activity lead to an underestimation of the effect. Second,
previous estimates of sports activity on health care utilization may have suffered from
an omitted variable bias. For example, sporty people may be more health-conscious,
which increases health care utilization and perceived health problems even in the ab-
sence of obvious health issues. For example, previous evidence has shown that higher
levels of body awareness are associated with more patient-initiated visits to HMO and
patient-initiated contacts with hospital emergency rooms among older adults (Hansell
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et al., 1991). Also, health-conscious subgroups of the population are more likely to
participate in screening-related health care utilization (Ioannou et al., 2003).
The endogeneity of sports activity is also important when estimating its effects on
back problems and headaches. The correlational estimation that only considers a set
of control variables associates sports activity with a small but significant reduction
in the frequency of back problems and headaches, whereas the IV estimates associate
sports activity with a small and statistically insignificant increase in the frequency
of these health issues. The non-IV results seem to be negatively biased and are
likely to suffer from a reverse causation issue. Individuals with back problems and
headaches (probably more than individuals with sleeping problems and overweight)
tend to reduce sports activity.
This paper has some limitations. The first limitation concerns the validity of the
instrument proximity to sports facilities. Our identifying assumption is that the prox-
imity to sports facilities is uncorrelated with unobserved determinants of health and
health care utilization. We argue that this assumption is plausible for three reasons:
first, because sports facilities are provided by communities and not by individuals,
reverse causality can be excluded. Second, community-level variables help to control
for potential confounders that are likely to be correlated with both the number of
sports facilities and health and health care utilization. Third, it is well-known that
individuals self-select into neighborhoods based on housing prices, housing quality,
commuter distance, school quality and/or environmental factors such as noise. How-
ever, non-work related travel distances (such as proximity to sports facilities) are
found to play only a negligible role in selecting a neighbourhood to live in (Lee et al.,
2010; Chatman, 2009). Nevertheless, as residential neighborhoods are not randomly
assigned, we cannot completely rule out that unobserved health determinants could
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influence residential sorting into neighborhoods with few or many sports facilities.
Future studies should conduct field experiments with representative samples out of
which a random subgroup is incentivized to participate in sports.
A second limitation is that we use a cross-sectional data set. While panel data
on sports facilities, individual sports activity and health-related outcomes are avail-
able, the variation of the number of sports facilities over time is too low to have any
statistical power in first-stage regressions. Therefore, the application of an instru-
mental variables strategy in fixed-effects models is not feasible (see Table A.4 in the
Appendix).
A third limitation is that the data on sports activity and health-related outcomes
is self-reported. Although the IV method helps to correct for reporting errors in
the sports activity measure, it does not eliminate reporting errors in the outcome
variables. A fourth limitation of our study is that we have data on sports activity
only at the consolidated level for all different types of sports and at the ordinal level
for the frequency of sports. Ideally, we would have data on subgroups of sports (e.g.,
football, tennis, jogging) and hours of weekly participation that would allow us to
estimate marginal effects of additional hours in different types of sports.
Despite these limitations, this paper makes an important contribution by providing
first IV estimates on the effects of sports activity on health and health care utilization
based on a representative sample. For doctor visits, overweight, and sleeping prob-
lems, the magnitudes of the causal effects are higher than indicated by correlations
between sports activity and these outcomes, indicating that measurement error and
omitted variables bias can lead to an underestimation of the associations in correla-
tional studies.
109
Appendix
Table A.1
Effects of sports activity on health care utilization and health: alternative cut-offs for being “active”.
IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3)
(>Weekly (original)) (>Monthly) (>Never)
Panel A: health care utilization outcomes (Negbin)
Number of doctor visits –1.475*** [0.229] –1.537*** [0.215] –1.591*** [0.204]
(0.531) (0.550) (0.554)
Number of hospital days –0.840 [0.432] –0.938 [0.391] –0.909 [0.403]
(1.438) (1.535) (1.515)
Panel B: health outcomes (LPM)
Overweight –0.280* –0.292* –0.300*
(0.165) (0.168) (0.175)
Sleeping problems –0.230** –0.240** –0.247**
(0.104) (0.112) (0.115)
Headaches 0.045 0.047 0.048
(0.100) (0.100) (0.105)
Back problems 0.097 0.102 0.105
(0.117) (0.124) (0.128)
Observations 6,558 6,558 6,558
F-test of excluded instrument in the first stage 33.71 35.62 36.32
Notes: IV (2SRI) estimates for sports activity are displayed with bootstrapped standard errors (999 reps) in paren-
theses. In Panel A, negative binomial MLE is used and incidence rate ratios are displayed in brackets. In Panel
B, OLS estimates are displayed. Column (1) to (3) refer to different sports activity thresholds for individuals to be
categorized as “active”. All models control for age, gender, marital status, education, household income, household
with children, community typology, and population density. All estimations also included a constant (not reported).
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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es
(LP
M
)
O
verw
eight
–0.211
–0.290*
–0.280*
–0.340**
–0.354*
(0.193)
(0.174)
(0.165)
(0.180)
(0.183)
Sleeping
problem
s
–0.334***
–0.321***
–0.230**
–0.178
–0.180
(0.126)
(0.111)
(0.104)
(0.118)
(0.114)
H
eadaches
–0.007
0.059
0.045
0.056
0.067
(0.112)
(0.101)
(0.100)
(0.107)
(0.104)
B
ack
problem
s
0.029
0.026
0.097
0.148
0.129
(0.135)
(0.124)
(0.117)
(0.126)
(0.124)
O
bservations
6,558
6,558
6,558
6,558
6,558
N
um
ber
ofsports
facilities
w
ithin
distance
boundary
13.70
18.45
23.41
28.67
34.37
Instrum
ent
coeffi
cient
in
the
first
stage
0.006***
0.006***
0.006***
0.005***
0.005***
F-test
ofexcluded
instrum
ent
in
the
first
stage
24.48
30.68
33.71
27.51
30.26
N
otes:
IV
(2SR
I)
estim
ates
for
w
eekly
sports
activity
are
displayed
and
bootstrapped
standard
errors
(999
reps)
are
given
in
parentheses.
In
PanelA
,negative
binom
ialM
LE
is
used
and
incidence
rate
ratios
are
displayed
in
brackets.
In
PanelB
,O
LS
estim
ates
are
displayed.
C
olum
n
(1)
to
(5)
refer
to
different
distance
boundaries
for
proxim
ity
to
sports
facilities.
A
llm
odels
controlfor
age,gender,m
aritalstatus,education,household
incom
e,household
w
ith
children,com
m
unity
typology,and
population
density.
A
llestim
ations
also
included
a
constant
(not
reported).
*,**,and
***
denote
statisticalsignificance
at
the
10%
,5%
,and
1%
levels,respectively.
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Table A.3
Effects of weekly sports activity on health care utilization and health: alternative estimation approach.
IV (First stage: LPM) IV (First stage: Probit)
(1) (2) (3)
(Negbin/LPM (original)) (Negbin/LPM) (Negbin/Probit)
Panel A: health care utilization outcomes
Number of doctor visits –1.475*** [0.229] –1.553*** [0.212] –1.553*** [0.212]
(0.531) (0.512) (0.512)
Number of hospital days –0.840 [0.432] –0.957 [0.384] –0.957 [0.384]
(1.438) (1.444) (1.444)
Panel B: health outcomes
Overweight –0.280* –0.253 –0.667 [–0.250]
(0.165) (0.160) (0.483)
Sleeping problems –0.230** –0.213** –1.284* [–0.252]
(0.104) (0.107) (0.659)
Headaches 0.045 0.090 0.726 [0.083]
(0.100) (0.097) (0.710)
Back problems 0.097 0.094 0.515 [0.076]
(0.117) (0.117) (0.630)
Observations 6,558 6,558 6,558
Notes: IV (2SRI) estimates for weekly sports activity are displayed and bootstrapped standard errors (999 reps) are
given in parentheses. In column (1), included residuals are obtained from a linear probability first-stage regression.
In column (2) and (3), included residuals are obtained from a Probit first-stage regression. In column (1) and (2),
OLS estimates are displayed for the binary outcomes in Panel B. In column (3), Probit estimates are displayed for
the binary outcomes in Panel B (with marginal effects at the mean in brackets). For all models in Panel A, negative
binomial MLE is used and incidence rate ratios are displayed in brackets. All models control for age, gender, marital
status, education, household income, household with children, community typology, and population density. *, **,
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table A.4
First-stage results: individual fixed-effects model with panel data from 1999 until 2008.
Variables LPM
FE1
Number of sports facilities within 6 miles –0.0001
(0.0006)
Demographic and socio-economic control variables Yes
Residential area control variables Yes
Individual fixed-effects Yes
Observations 65,909
Number of individuals 14,574
F-test of excluded instrument in the first stage 0.01
Notes: The estimation included 10 years of individual panel data from 1999 to 2008. The data on sports facilities
is drawn and interpolated from the 1998, 2001, 2005, and 2008 Swiss Business Census. Data on population density
is drawn and interpolated from the 1990, 2000, and 2010 Swiss Population Census. All other variables are directly
drawn from the SHP surveys 1999–2008. In Model FE1, OLS estimates for Eq. (1) including individual fixed-effects
are displayed. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for individuals that do sports at
least once a week and a value of 0 otherwise. The estimation also included a constant (not reported). *, **, and ***
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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